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ROLLING BACK THE TIDE: TOWARD AN        
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR FLOOD INSURANCE 
Alexander Lemann* 
The National Flood Insurance Program is in flux—and under 
attack. On March 13, 2014, Congress passed the Homeowner Flood 
Insurance Affordability Act, delaying and dismantling many of the 
reforms it had put in place just twenty months earlier, when it passed 
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.  Today, 
flood insurance is both a critical part of the country’s approach to 
dealing with the rising flood threat posed by climate change and a 
beleaguered and perpetually broke symbol of governmental 
ineptitude, leading to calls for its elimination. By providing federally-
subsidized flood insurance, critics argue, the National Flood 
Insurance Program has insulated flood victims from the risks they 
face, encouraged development in flood prone areas and, 
paradoxically, increased the country’s overall exposure to flooding. 
 This account, however, gives short shrift to the Program’s 
sophistication and ability to discourage development in flood plains.  
In fact, the Program’s woes can largely be traced to two intertwined 
flaws: its weak mechanism for requiring coverage and its hesitation 
to charge premiums that reflect the actual risk policyholders face.  In 
this Article, I argue that establishing an individual mandate for flood 
insurance, which would require all property owners in flood-prone 
areas to maintain policies, would do much to solve these problems 
and make the National Flood Insurance Program a powerful tool in 
the ongoing effort to mitigate our growing flood risk. By mandating 
coverage and charging rates that reflect the risk faced by each 
                                                 
* Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP.  J.D., 2011, Columbia Law School, A.B., 
2006, Harvard College.  The views expressed in this Article are mine and should 
not be attributed to Sullivan & Cromwell or its clients.  I would like to thank 
Robert Ferguson and Oliver Houck for their comments, and Amanda Cook for her 
insight, patience, and support.  Many thanks as well to the staff of the Fordham 
Environmental Law Review for their help in preparing this Article for publication. 
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property, the National Flood Insurance Program could strike the 
difficult balance between providing a safety net to flood victims and 
discouraging flood-prone development, a goal that has eluded the 
Program over the course of its forty-six year history. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Flooding is the most common and most costly natural disaster in 
the United States, and, thanks largely to climate change, the toll it 
takes is increasing.1  Over the coming century, coastal areas will be 
inundated by rising seas, pounded by powerful storms, and left 
exposed by the erosion of wetlands and barrier islands.  Inland areas, 
particularly near rivers, will face increased flooding too, as patterns 
of rainfall shift towards more frequent and intense downpours.  The 
United States is not, following the example of the Dutch, likely to 
find comfort in a massive engineering solution.  The flood risks we 
face are too massive, and too geographically diffuse, to be mitigated 
by a series of dams and levees, however expensive and complex.2  To 
most who have examined the problem, the solution that presents 
itself is retreat: we must begin to discourage new development in 
flood-prone areas and encourage the abandonment of the riskiest 
places.3 
                                                 
 1. Patricia E. Salkin, 40th Anniversary of the Quiet Revolution in Zoning and 
Land Use Regulation: Article: The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the 
Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 272 (2012) (citing Rawle O. King, Federal 
Flood Insurance: The Repetitive Loss Problem (Cong. Research Serv., RL 32972, 
2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32972.pdf)).  Between 1981 
and 2011, flooding caused an average of nearly $8 billion in property and crop 
damage per year, and killed 4,586 people.  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD 
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 80 (Jerry M. Melillo, Terese Richmond, & Gary 
W. Yohe, eds., 2014), available at nca2014.globalchange.gov [hereinafter Third 
National Climate Assessment]. 
 2. See, e.g., William J. Broad, In Europe, High-Tech Flood Control, with 
Nature’s Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at F1.  Because half the Netherlands, 
including both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, lies below sea level, the enormous cost 
of the country’s sophisticated levee system is often expressed as a portion of the 
gross national product.  The geographic diversity of the flood risks confronting the 
U.S. prevents this kind of project, or this kind of thinking. 
 3. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat is the 
Best Option: Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change 
Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 696 (2014); Michael Kimmelman, Going 
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The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) has the potential 
to play a significant role in furthering this project.  The NFIP has 
long been controversial.4  Since its creation in 1968, it has provided 
flood insurance, a market private companies had abandoned due to 
the enormous, difficult to quantify, and highly correlated risks 
involved.  Premiums under the NFIP are in many cases “subsidized” 
in the sense that they do not reflect the true measure of risk most 
policyholders actually face.  While the NFIP has made great strides 
in evaluating flood risks and encouraging the adoption of mitigation 
measures, its implied subsidy has been a near-constant source of 
controversy and has plunged what was supposed to be a self-
sustaining program deep into debt.5 
Congress has frequently set out to reform the NFIP, usually with 
lackluster results.  In July 2012, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters 
Flood Insurance Reform Act, a major step forward in eliminating 
subsidized rates and giving the program a chance at self-sufficiency.6  
As Biggert-Waters took effect and policyholders received notice that 
their premiums would increase, however, a political backlash began 
to grow against it, resulting in the repeal of certain key provisions by 
the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which 
                                                                                                                 
with the Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 17, 2013, at AR1 (describing a proposal by 
Governor Cuomo to pay residents of flood-prone areas to relocate); Lisa A. St. 
Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands: Opportunities for a Peaceful 
Migration, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (describing a strategy of 
“institutionalizing the presumption that humanly constructed structures will have to 
give way to migrating wetlands as sea level rises”); NEW YORK STATE SEA LEVEL 
RISE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 60 (2010), available at 
www.dec.ny.gov/energy/67778.html (calling for reducing “incentives that increase 
or perpetuate development in high-risk locations” and creating “incentives for 
sustainable adaptation planning,” particularly “adaptive transition of infrastructure 
and development over time”). 
 4. See generally Scott Gabriel Knowles & Howard C. Kunreuther, Troubled 
Waters: The National Flood Insurance Program in Historical Perspective, 26 J. 
POLICY HISTORY 327 (2014). 
 5. The NFIP has the statutory authority to borrow from the U.S. Treasury, up 
to a certain limit.  See infra note 113.  The program always succeeded in paying 
back what it owed, until 2005, when is suffered $19 billion in losses, more than the 
total losses of the program since its inception. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
REDUCING COASTAL RISKS ON THE EAST AND GULF COASTS 41 (National 
Academies Press 2014).  As of 2013, its debt stood at $30.4 billion.  Id. 
 6. See Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 328-29; Verchick & Johnson, 
supra note 3, at 708-09, 714-15. 
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was signed into law on March 21st.7 These changes illustrate the 
tension between providing a safety net in the form of affordable, 
available flood insurance and the danger inherent in socializing the 
costs of floods, which leads to a false sense of security and 
encourages risky development. 
A major hindrance in the NFIP’s efforts to strike the appropriate 
balance between adequately insuring policyholders against risk and 
providing a significant subsidy to flood-prone development has been 
the lack of an individual mandate.  The program’s “lender mandate,” 
both underinclusive and underenforced, leaves a shocking number of 
homeowners without flood insurance. It also leaves the NFIP 
vulnerable to the “adverse selection” problem, a classic plague of 
insurance markets in which those who face the lowest risk are the 
most likely to opt-out of buying insurance.8  Requiring that all 
property owners in flood-prone areas maintain flood insurance 
policies would help both the NFIP and the urgent national project of 
mitigating our exposure to flood risk in several important ways.  
First, it would strengthen the NFIP financially, helping end its 
crushing debt.  Second, it would close some of the holes in its social 
safety net, providing compensation to victims of floods predictably 
and quickly, and relieving pressure on Congress to pass massive aid 
packages in the wake of major disasters.  Finally, and perhaps most 
crucially, an individual mandate for flood insurance would 
discourage development in flood-prone areas by monetizing and 
annualizing the flood risk property owners face, helping overcome 
the tangle of cognitive biases that prevent us from thinking about 
unlikely yet catastrophic risks in rational ways. 
Part II of this Article presents the problem of our national exposure 
to flood risk, which is set to increase dramatically over the course of 
the next century.  Part III describes the NFIP in some detail and 
examines the ways in which the program has helped quantify, 
mitigate, and insure against flood risks.  Part III also explores 
Congress’s recent efforts to reform the NFIP, and the reasons some 
observers have called for its outright elimination.  In Part IV, I 
present a proposed solution, an individual mandate for flood 
insurance, and explore the ways in which mandated coverage and 
actuarial rates would together help save the NFIP from the moral 
                                                 
 7. Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020. 
 8. See infra Part III.F. 
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hazard problem that has haunted it since before it was created.  With 
these reforms, I argue, the NFIP could be a powerful yet flexible tool 
in discouraging flood-prone settlement, imposing on property owners 
costs that, unlike the chance of a catastrophic flood, would be 
impossible to ignore. 
II.  SEA LEVEL RISE, FLOODING, AND FEDERAL POLICY 
Our changing climate will increase the flood risk we face in a few 
important ways.  First, the melting of polar ice caps and thermal 
expansion of sea water will increase the volume of water in the 
world’s oceans, leading to global increases in sea level.  The rise in 
sea level is sometimes estimated at between one and four feet over 
the next century.9  The bottom end of that range, one foot of sea level 
rise, is expected even without any contribution from melting ice 
sheets in Greenland and Antarctica.10  Rising sea levels are worse 
than a “flood” in the usual sense of the word: they lead to 
“inundation,” a permanent retreat of the coastline as rising seas 
forever submerge low-lying coastal areas.11  Moreover, the rate of sea 
level rise is increasing.  Since 1992, the rate of sea level rise has been 
roughly twice the rate observed over the last century. 
The intrusion of salty ocean water also destroys coastal wetlands, 
eroding vast areas of land that form a buffer zone between populated 
areas and the ocean.12  Southern Louisiana, for instance, has lost 
1,880 square miles of coastal land since the 1930s, effectively 
bringing New Orleans closer to the Gulf of Mexico while dismantling 
its natural defenses against storm surges.13  The intensity, frequency, 
and duration of hurricanes in the North Atlantic have increased since 
the early 1980s, and they are expected to continue increasing as the 
                                                 
 9. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 44.  Global sea level 
has already risen about eight inches since the late nineteenth century.  Id. 
 10. Id. at 45. 
 11. MATTHEW J.P. COOPER, MICHAEL D. BEEVERS, AND MICHAEL 
OPPENHEIMER, FUTURE SEA LEVEL RISE AND THE NEW JERSEY COAST: ASSESSING 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 7 (Science, Technology and 
Environmental Policy Program, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, 2005). 
 12. See Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 582. 
 13. Id. at 402 (citing BRADY R. COUVILLION, ET AL., LAND AREA CHANGE IN 
COASTAL LOUISIANA FROM 1932 TO 2010: U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC 
INVESTIGATIONS MAP 3164, available at pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3164/). 
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climate warms.14  The magnitude of the problem presented by rising 
seas is staggering.  In the United States alone, nearly 5 million people 
live within four feet of the local high-tide level, and a sea level rise of 
only two feet would inundate more than $1 trillion worth of 
property.15 
Nor are inland areas immune.  Climate change has already begun 
to worsen the frequency and severity of heavy rains.  The U.S. 
Global Change Research Program’s Third National Climate 
Assessment listed among its “key messages” the fact that “heavy 
downpours” are increasing, evidence of “a clear national trend 
toward a greater amount of precipitation being concentrated in very 
heavy events.”16  The Northeast, in particular, saw a 71 percent 
increase in the amount of precipitation falling in the heaviest 1 
percent of storms from 1958 to 2012.17  These trends are projected to 
continue, even in regions where overall precipitation levels are 
expected to decrease as a result of a warming climate.18  These 
changes in rainfall are projected to lead, unsurprisingly, to an 
increase in flooding along many rivers.19 
                                                 
 14. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 20, 41; COOPER, ET AL., 
supra note 11, at 9.  While the National Climate Assessment notes that there is 
disagreement among the models as to whether the strongest hurricanes are likely to 
become more frequent, it warns that the models are “in better agreement when 
projecting changes in hurricane precipitation – almost all existing studies project 
greater rainfall rates in hurricanes in a warmer climate, with projected increases of 
about 20% averaged near the center of hurricanes.” Third National Climate 
Assessment, supra note 1, at 42. 
 15. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 45, 589.  The migration 
of the U.S. population into coastal areas over the course of the second half of the 
twentieth century is one reason the costs of flooding from coastal storms has 
increased so dramatically.  See Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 327-28.  
Since 1950, Florida, for instance, has experienced a 579 percent increase in 
population, the highest in the nation, and has risen from the twentieth most 
populous state to the fourth. Id. 
 16. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 9. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 37; Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change 
While Planning for Disaster: Footholds, Rope Lines, and the Iowa Floods, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 2203, 2206 (citing U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (2009), 
available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-
report.pdf. 
 19. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 40.  The report notes, 
however, that the precise relationship between increasing downpours and river 
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The central irony of our efforts to help alleviate the risk of flooding 
over the past century is that we have actually made the problem 
worse.  The goals of disaster policy are twofold: first, preparing for 
disasters before they strike so as to mitigate the harms they cause, 
and second, helping people recover after a disaster occurs.  These 
goals are naturally in tension. By attempting to insulate certain 
populations from disasters, we have dramatically increased the 
number of people exposed to them.  Experts call this the “safe 
development paradox.”  By making development “safe,” flood 
control structures actually make people less safe, by encouraging 
development in risky areas.20 
New Orleans provides a stark example.  The neighborhood known 
as New Orleans East was basically a vast swamp until the late 60’s.21  
When Hurricane Betsy provided the impetus for the construction of a 
massive new levee system around New Orleans, the levees were also 
designed to encircle then-uninhabited New Orleans East.22  A cost-
benefit analysis conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency in 1976 attributed only twenty-one percent of the benefit of 
the new levee system to protecting the city of New Orleans as it then 
existed.  Seventy-nine percent of the project’s benefits were to come 
from new development in previously empty areas that would now be 
protected.23  Indeed, New Orleans East rapidly became a popular 
suburb.24  In the days after Hurricane Katrina, parts of the area were 
more than ten feet underwater.25 
Not only do flood control devices encourage settlement in areas of 
high flood risk by creating an illusion of safety, they can also 
                                                                                                                 
flooding is not known, since the largest increases in heavy rains may occur during 
the summer and fall, when the ground tends to be drier and more capable of 
absorbing rainwater. Id. 
 20. See Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of 
Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for 
Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173 
(2006). 
 21. Id. at 175. 
 22. Id. at 174 – 75. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 22,000 new housing units were built in the area between 1970 and 2000. Id. 
at 176. 
 25. CHRISTINE F. ANDERSON, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION 
SYSTEM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 32 (2007) (report by American Society 
of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel). 
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exacerbate the risk itself by increasing the severity of the floods they 
are supposed to prevent.  Wetlands and coastal vegetation act as 
natural “sponges” that help soak up storm surges.26  When those 
areas are “hardscaped” by development, they no longer perform this 
function.27  Development along sandy beaches poses similar risks.  
When left alone, beaches and barrier islands migrate as the action of 
waves and storms picks up and redistributes sand.28  Towns with 
buildings along beaches have often sought to prevent the loss of the 
land on which they sit—and its attendant flooding—by building 
concrete seawalls, but scientists now know that seawalls only 
accelerate the erosion of beaches.29  The only viable option for 
keeping such places intact as they currently exist consists of periodic 
“beach replenishment,” which involves dredging sand from the ocean 
and depositing it along beaches to form large man-made dunes.  The 
Army Corps of Engineers has erected a twenty-two foot high 
protective rampart made of sand to protect one such town, Harvey 
Cedars, New Jersey, population 337.  The project cost twenty-six 
million dollars, of which the town itself paid barely one percent.30 
Many dams, particularly on western rivers, were constructed solely 
to prevent floods.31  While they often serve that function well for the 
                                                 
 26. John Rudolf, et al., Hurricane Sandy Damage Amplified by Breakneck 
Development of Coast, The Huffington Post, Nov. 12, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/hurricane-sandy-
damage_n_2114525.html. 
 27. Id. 
 28. John Seabrook, The Beach Builders: Can the Jersey Shore be Saved?, NEW 
YORKER, July 22, 2013, at 42, 45; Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-level 
Rise and its Impact on Coastal Zones, 328 SCIENCE 1517 (2010). 
 29. See generally ORRIN H. PILKEY & KATHARINE DIXON WHEELER, THE 
CORPS AND THE SHORE (Island Press 1998). 
 30. The federal government paid about 65% of the cost, while the State paid 
just under 35%. Seabrook, supra note 28, at 44.  Ironically, takings clause 
jurisprudence requires that local governments pay homeowners along the beach — 
precisely those who benefit most from the protection of new sand dunes — for the 
privilege of blocking the views from the first floors of their homes. See Kate 
Zernike, Court Sides with Town on Price of Views Lost to Dune, N.Y. TIMES, July 
9, 2013, at A16 (reporting New Jersey appellate court’s decision that value of flood 
protection must be considered in determining just compensation for homeowners’ 
loss of view). 
 31. See Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 517-26 (1941) (describing 
history of reservoirs as flood control measures on tributaries of the Mississippi); 
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communities immediately downstream, they also trap silt that would 
otherwise flow out to the ocean and contribute to the creation of new 
land along the coast.  Such dams thus deprive coastal communities of 
their naturally-recharging shields against storm surges.  Indeed, levee 
systems along rivers that prevent seasonal flooding have this same 
effect.  One study estimated that without the yearly replenishment of 
silt that seasonal flooding would naturally provide, coastal Louisiana 
was “sinking beneath the Gulf of Mexico at a rate of more than forty 
square miles a year.”32  Moreover, by eliminating smaller floodplains 
upstream, levees exacerbate flooding downstream, as floodwaters are 
shunted along instead of “naturally spread,” “filtered into 
underground aquifers,” and “released slowly, as from a sponge.”33 
These examples support the growing realization that it will not be 
possible to engineer our way out of this problem.  Unlike the 
Netherlands, the United States does not have the option of building a 
single magic-bullet flood control system that is capable of mitigating 
the flood risk we face.  This kind of solution is neither politically nor 
practically possible, as the United States faces risks that are more 
dispersed and yet also more intense than those faced by the 
Netherlands.34  In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, much attention was 
drawn to the longstanding question of whether New York City 
should, like London, construct flood control gates at the entrances to 
its harbor to block an incoming storm surge.  Such a project, it has 
been estimated, would cost between $10 and $17 billion, and would 
only protect areas inside the gates.35  Outside that zone, a solid 
barrier would actually make flooding worse, by as much as 20 
percent.36  For now, the idea of a flood gate straddling New York 
harbor has been shelved, and the response to Hurricane Sandy has 
instead focused on more prosaic measures, like raising the subway’s 
                                                                                                                 
MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING 
WATER 182-94 (1993) (same). 
 32. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Food Insurance Program and 
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 124-25 (1985); see also MARC REISNER, CADILLAC 
DESERT 475 (1993). 
 33. Houck, supra note 32, at 81 (citing Belt, The 1979 Flood and Man’s 
Constriction of the Mississippi River, 189 SCIENCE 681 (1975)). 
 34. See supra note 2. 
 35. Mireya Navarro, Weighing Sea Barriers as Protection for New York, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A21. 
 36. Id. 
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ventilation grates and paying homeowners to move out of vulnerable 
homes.37 
With rising seas creating an ever-increasing risk of catastrophic 
flooding (and even permanent inundation) and large-scale 
engineering simply incapable of immunizing coastal residents from 
flood risk, many have concluded that encouraging a retreat from the 
coast must become a major component of efforts to prepare for 
floods.38  After Hurricane Sandy, an op-ed in the New York Times 
suggested that the way to “end the cycle of repairing or rebuilding 
properties in the path of future storms” was to “begin to retreat from 
the ocean’s edge.”39  Where simply moving inland isn’t feasible or is 
too costly, homes, businesses, and infrastructure will need to be made 
resilient to flooding to one degree or another.  Policymakers at all 
levels have begun to recognize that our response to escalating flood 
risk will necessarily include both relocation and adaptation, 
implemented on a largely individual level.40  Indeed, a 2014 study by 
the National Research Council found that “[s]trategies that reduce the 
consequences of coastal storms, such as hazard zoning, building 
elevation, land purchase, and setbacks” (which the study referred to 
collectively as “consequence reduction strategies”) have cost-benefit 
ratios as high as 1:8, and yet have been neglected by policymakers.  
Between 2004 and 2012, the study noted, federal funds set aside for 
these strategies represented only five percent of the funds allocated to 
disaster relief.41 
Accepting the inevitability of permanent changes to our nation’s 
coastline leads to a stark realization.  If the chief goal of our national 
disaster policy is to minimize the risk we face by moving people 
away from the coasts, then virtually all our efforts to mitigate flood 
                                                 
 37. See Kia Gregory & Marc Santora, Bloomberg Outlines $20 Billion Storm 
Protection Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 12, 2013, at A1.  Conspicuously absent from 
Mayor Bloomberg’s plan was a barrier across the harbor. See NEW YORK CITY 
SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, MORE 
RESILIENT NEW YORK 49, June 11, 2013, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml (discussing downsides of 
two possible harbor barrier proposals). 
 38. See supra note 3. 
 39. Orrin H. Pilkey, Op-Ed., We Need to Retreat from the Beach, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2012, at A35. 
 40. See, e.g., Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 594-95; NYC 
SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, supra note 37, at 69 et seq. 
 41. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 5, 87-89. 
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risk begin to seem counterproductive.  Every dollar spent helping 
prevent floods, helping people survive floods, or even helping 
communities rebuild after floods represents a quantum of risk that is 
being borne by the federal government and not by people living in 
areas of flood risk.  Such efforts have provided a massive subsidy to 
coastal development, a policy that is literally disastrous. 
Some modern critics, surveying this history, have come to view the 
National Flood Insurance Program as a prime culprit.  By providing 
flood insurance at below-market rates to homeowners in flood-prone 
areas, the NFIP subsidizes coastal development, helping externalize 
the risks homeowners face and thus disguising their magnitude.  This 
subsidy encourages coastal development by effectively making it 
more affordable, putting more people in harm’s way and thus 
increasing the magnitude of the damage wrought by floods.  This 
observation has been a theme of the many and repeated calls for the 
elimination of the program.42  On the other hand, even those who 
insist most fervently that coastal development is unsustainable do not 
suggest that all coastal development be abandoned.43  Living on the 
coast to be close to a job might well make sense for some people, and 
there are many instances in which the benefits people derive from 
living in such areas outweigh the risks, regardless of how those risks 
are allocated. 
The risk of flooding is a type of externality, one that has 
historically been spread onto taxpayers as a whole.  In order to 
achieve what could be called an efficient outcome (coastal 
development occurring only when its benefits outweigh its risks), 
property owners, as “least cost avoiders,” must be forced to bear the 
costs of the flooding to which they expose themselves.44  As 
                                                 
 42. See, e.g., Judith Kildow & Jason Scorse, End Federal Flood Insurance, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2012, at A31; Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, 
Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 Conn. 
Ins. L.J. 1, 42 et seq. (2011) (proposing replacement of the NFIP with universal 
social safety net for flood losses paid for by tax withholding); see also Knowles & 
Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 343 (characterizing the moral hazard argument as a 
“key critique that has plagued the NFIP”). 
 43. See Pilkey, supra note 39 (arguing that “surviving buildings and new 
construction should be elevated on pilings” and that “some buildings should be 
moved back from the beach”). 
 44. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules 
and Inalienability: One view of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 
(1972).  It is at least arguable that owners of flood prone property are not always 
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discussed in more detail below, spreading this risk prevents this 
decision from being made, as it masks the costs of flooding from 
those who have some ability to decide whether they live in a flood 
zone or not.  There is a simpler way of putting the problem.  
Artificially low flood insurance premiums essentially trick people 
into thinking that living on the coast is safer than it is.  Research has 
shown that people are bad at evaluating risks that are highly unlikely 
and yet catastrophic if they occur.45  Flood insurance premiums serve 
a messaging function: someone has quantified the risk you face for 
you, and this figure approximates its gravity.  When that figure is 
artificially low, people are being told that their situation is less risky 
than it actually is. 
The NFIP is a preexisting mechanism for compelling homeowners 
in areas of high flood risk to recognize and bear some of the cost of 
the risk they face, even if its premiums have been set at artificially 
low levels.  Far from being ripe for outright abolition, the NFIP 
actually has the potential to be a potent weapon in the struggle to 
limit and discourage development that puts people in the way of 
floods.  The NFIP has always had features that were aimed at 
minimizing flood risk.  Its ineffectiveness, and its historical status as 
an ill-advised subsidy to coastal development, could be corrected by 
implementing an individual mandate requiring all homeowners in 
flood zones to participate in the program.  With this modification, 
and with premiums adjusted upwards, the NFIP could play a crucial 
role in performing the delicate balancing act required by disaster 
preparation.  The program would thus be able to achieve its goal of 
                                                                                                                 
properly considered the least cost avoiders when it comes to their exposure to flood 
risk.  For instance, it may not be reasonable to expect that someone who was born 
and raised in a flood-prone neighborhood of New Orleans has the means to relocate 
out of concern for the area’s flood risk, even if that person is a homeowner. See 
infra note 185.  Moreover, because flood risks are highly correlated, focusing on an 
individual property owner may provide a misleading answer to the question of who 
is able to prevent the harm of flooding at least cost.  In the case of many 
communities, it may well be that government can mitigate the risk of flooding 
through engineering at less cost than the individuals within that community would 
incur, collectively, by moving out or paying for their homes to be elevated.  A 
representative government should, however, be responsive to the flood risk of its 
people (as manifested in the collective burden of flood insurance premiums), and 
there are reasons to think that mandating coverage would increase this 
responsiveness. See infra notes 209-211. 
 45. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
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helping protect people from crippling losses while at the same time 
discouraging irresponsible development. 
III.  THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
The roots of the NFIP can be traced back at least as far as 1927, 
when the Mississippi River burst its banks and flooded 
approximately 26,000 square miles, killing more than 200 people, 
displacing 600,000 others, and causing roughly $5 billion in property 
damage.46  Insurers, who at the time provided flood insurance, 
suffered staggering losses in the 1927 floods due to a characteristic of 
flood risk called “correlation.”47  When risks are not correlated, the 
risk of a harm befalling a particular individual (or policyholder) is 
unrelated to the risk that another individual will suffer the same 
harm.  For instance, the risk that anyone will suffer a heart attack in a 
given day is not correlated with the risk that his or her neighbor will 
suffer a heart attack that same day.  Flood risk is quite different.  As 
insurers learned in 1927, the risk that a particular home will be 
destroyed by a flood is highly correlated with the risk that 
neighboring homes – and thousands of others – will be destroyed at 
the same time.  Thus, even though there might be only a one percent 
chance of a flood in a given year, when that flood occurs it is likely 
to affect thousands of properties at the same time.48  This feature of 
                                                 
 46. Houck, supra note 32, at n.98.  The flood is estimated to have cost 
$364,533,154 in damage in 1927 dollars.  Id.  The figure above was updated using 
the inflation calculator on the website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  See CPI 
Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.  See also Adam F. Scales, A Nation of 
Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. 
L. REV. 3, 7 (2006). 
 47. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 23-24 (citing DAVID A. MOSS, 
WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 262 
(2002)); see also James Ming Chen, Correlation, Coverage, and Catastrophe: The 
Contours of Financial Preparedness for Disaster, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 56, 
65-66 (2014) (referring to correlation as “the most insidious factor undermining the 
financial integrity of private insurance for catastrophic risk”). 
 48. Id.; Scales, supra note 46, at 10-11.  Luke and Abramovsky note that private 
insurance companies would address this problem by charging “front-loaded 
premiums to create a large reserve in case the low probability event occurred early 
in the life of the risk pool,” which has the effect of making flood insurance less 
attractive to individuals. Supra note 42, at 23-24.  Another tactic insurance 
companies have adopted to combat highly correlated risks is establishing an array 
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flood risk is what makes it so difficult for private insurers to spread 
the risk evenly across their policyholders, and a major part of the 
reason private insurers had simply stopped providing flood insurance 
by the mid 20th century.49 
Into this void stepped the federal government. The move toward 
the creation of a national flood insurance program proceeded in fits 
and starts until 1968, when Congress passed the National Flood 
Insurance Act, which created the NFIP.50  The NFIP is administered 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) and 
provides flood insurance to those who live in certain areas.  Among 
the program’s complex provisions are features that encourage those 
who participate to reduce their flood risk and that link the amount of 
premiums property owners must pay to the riskiness of their 
situations.  Crucially, however, most NFIP policyholders pay 
subsidized rates, and the program lacks an individual mandate.  
These two factors contribute to the program’s financial troubles and 
hamper its ability to reduce the nation’s flood risk, even while it 
helps insulate individuals from the financial costs of particular 
floods. 
This Part describes the NFIP in some detail and examines the 
various ways in which its provisions have fallen short of their 
intended goals.  Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C discuss the three key 
features of the NFIP: flood risk evaluation, mitigation, and 
                                                                                                                 
of subsidiaries that issue policies in narrow geographic areas.  When large losses 
occur, these subsidiaries are simply allowed to go bankrupt without affecting the 
exposure of the parent corporation.  Scales, supra note 46, at 11.  This practice has, 
needless to say, been controversial. Id. at n.29. 
 49. Between 1952 and 1955, after massive floods in Kansas and Missouri, the 
insurance industry published a series of reports concluding that flood insurance 
could not be successfully underwritten by private insurers. AM. INS. ASS’N., 
STUDIES OF FLOODS AND FLOOD DAMAGE 1952-1955, at 3 (1956), cited in, Wesse 
& Ooms, The National Flood Insurance Program—Did the Insurance Industry 
Drop Out?, 31 CHARTERED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS J. 187 n.5 
(1978). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 4011 et seq. (2012); Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572.  
Hurricane Betsy struck the Gulf Coast in 1965, prompting Congress to pass the 
Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-339, 79 Stat. 
1301, which directed the Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
prepare a report on the feasibility of a comprehensive approach to compensation for 
flood victims.  The resulting report, which was submitted to Congress in 1966, 
recommended the creation of a national flood insurance program, among other 
measures. Houck, supra note 32, at 68-69. 
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insurance.51  Part III.D discusses the NFIP’s longstanding lack of 
financial soundness.  Part III.E reviews recent efforts to reform the 
NFIP, particularly the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act 
of 2012 and the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 
2014.  Finally, Part III.F examines the limited mechanism by which 
the NFIP requires certain property owners to purchase flood 
insurance and the failures in this mechanism.  As will be shown, the 
NFIP is a tool for shifting risk, one that, if properly calibrated, could 
do much to help encourage more rational development in flood-prone 
areas while also aiding the swift and predictable recovery from 
disasters. 
A.  Evaluating the Risk 
The NFIP first tasks FEMA with evaluating the flood risk faced by 
essentially every property in the country.52  This involves a two step 
analysis.  First, FEMA identifies what it calls “special flood hazard 
areas,” which are areas that have a 1 percent chance of experiencing a 
flood in any given year.53  This statistical construct – the flood with a 
1 percent chance of occurring in any given year, also known as a 
“100-year flood” – is the foundation on which much of the NFIP is 
built.54  Special flood hazard areas, or “100-year flood zones,” are 
                                                 
 51. The NFIP has been tweaked by legislation many times over the course of its 
existence.  The details of this evolution are outside the scope of this Article, and are 
well chronicled elsewhere.  See, e.g., Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4; 
HOWARD KUNREUTHER & DOUGLAS C. DACY, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL 
DISASTERS 259 (1969); Beth Davison, Note: How Quickly We Forget: The 
National Flood Insurance Program and Floodplain Development in Missouri, 19 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 365, 366-69 (2005). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 4101.  Reliably predicting the flood risk of an individual 
property requires complex hydrological studies and was another key barrier private 
insurers faced in attempting to provide flood insurance. Edward T. Pasterick, The 
National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE 
OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 128 
(Howard Kunreuther and Richard Roth, eds. 1998); Scales, supra note 46, at 8. 
 53. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2014); Houck, supra note 32, at 74.  FEMA refers to 
floods that have a 1 percent chance of occurring in a given year as “base floods,” 
and to the height of the water during such floods as the “base flood elevation.” 44 
C.F.R. § 59.1. 
 54. The term “100-year flood” is somewhat misleading, as it is often mistakenly 
assumed that such a flood will occur only once in each hundred year period.  
Because floods do not occur at regular intervals, however, the occurrence of one 
100-year flood says nothing about when the next will arrive.  See Scales, supra 
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depicted on a rough preliminary map called a “Flood Hazard 
Boundary Map,” which typically shows only the outline of the 
special flood hazard area, marked as “Zone A.”55  At this stage, with 
only the Flood Hazard Boundary Map complete, only limited “first 
layer coverage” is available.56  The idea is that a participating 
community will proceed from this “emergency phase” to the “regular 
program” as rapidly as possible (which has, indeed, already happened 
for the vast majority of participating communities).57 
Before a community can transition from the emergency program to 
the regular program, FEMA must complete a “flood insurance rate 
study,” a comprehensive examination of the area’s flood risks that 
results in a “flood insurance rate map,” commonly referred to as a 
“FIRM.”58  In addition to showing areas of minimal, moderate, and 
special flood hazard, a FIRM provides detailed information about 
how severe flooding is likely to be in the event of a 100-year flood.  
The series of symbols used by FEMA to mark areas of varying 
hazard give some sense of how complex a FIRM can be.  Within 
Zone A (areas that will be inundated during a 100-year flood), a 
FIRM can use the symbol A0 to denote an area of “shallow water 
depths and/or unpredictable flow paths between 1 and 3 feet” and the 
symbols A1 to A30 to denote the depth of the water in an area at 
“base flood elevation,” which is the water level during a 100-year 
flood.59  The maps also take into account flood protection systems 
that might keep an otherwise flood-prone area dry: the code A99 
denotes an “area of special flood hazard where enough progress has 
been made on a protective system . . . to consider it complete for 
                                                                                                                 
note 46, at 9, n.23 (“What the average person actually understands . . . is that once 
there has already been such a flood in his area, he is safe for the next ninety-nine 
years.”).  FEMA now prefers to express the chance of flooding by telling 
homeowners in 100-year flood zones that they face a twenty-five percent chance of 
flooding at least once over the course of a 30-year mortgage.  See FloodSmart.gov: 
The official site of the NFIP, About the National Flood Insurance Program: When 
insurance is required, www.floodsmart.gov/pages/about/when_insurance_is_ 
required.jsp; see also National Research Council, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that 
“[i]n recent years the trend has been to call this the ‘1 percent chance’ event, to 
emphasize that the event could happen at any time”). 
 55. 44 C.F.R. § 64.3(a)(2); Houck, supra note 32, at 74. 
 56. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 59.3. 
 57. Id. at § 59.3; Houck, supra note 32, at 76. 
 58. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 60.3(e). 
 59. Id. § 64.3(a)(1). 
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insurance rating purposes,” while the code AR denotes an area of 
flood hazard resulting from “the decertification of a previously 
accredited flood protection system that is determined to be in the 
process of being restored to provide base flood protection.”60  A 
FIRM may also use codes ranging from V or V0 to V30 to denote 
“coastal high hazard areas” where flood waters might have velocity 
(giving them much more destructive potential).61  Finally, there are 
special codes to indicate varying degrees of mudslide risk, erosion 
hazards, and “undetermined but possible flood hazards.”62  In 
essence, the key feature of the FIRM is that it depicts the difference 
between a given property’s surface elevation and the base flood 
elevation, and thus gives a sense of how many feet of water will 
cover the property in the event of a statistically average 100-year 
flood.63 
B.  Mitigating the Risk 
Participation in the NFIP is community-based: flood insurance is 
only available to those who live in communities that participate in the 
program.64  The program thus holds out an incentive to communities 
to participate in offering flood insurance to their residents, but it also 
carries a threat.  In non-participating communities, federal grants, 
                                                 
 60. Id.  Notably, however, there is no provision by which a FIRM (or, as a 
result, an individual’s flood insurance premiums) can take into account the 
likelihood that a levee will fail. See Burby, supra note 20, at 177.  New Orleans is 
far from the only example.  In 1987, FEMA estimated that approximately one-third 
of all flood disasters involved levee overtopping or failure. Id. at 176. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Houck, supra note 32, at 77, n.84.  One study conducted by FEMA 
estimated that roughly 3 percent of the U.S. population lives in coastal special 
flood hazard areas.  Mark Crowell, et al., An Estimate of the U.S. Population Living 
in 100-Year Coastal Flood Hazard Areas, 26 J. OF COASTAL RESEARCH 201, 201 
(2010). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 4102(c).  The regulations define “community” as any political 
subdivision “with the authority to adopt and enforce flood plain management 
regulations for the areas within its jurisdiction.” 44 C.F.R. § 59.1.  Individuals in 
non-participating communities must rely on post-hoc government assistance or on 
private flood insurance, which is virtually non-existent. Luke & Abramovsky, 
supra note 42, at 8 n.31.  This is a rare situation: “most flood-prone communities 
that have elected not to participate are communities whose areas of serious flood 
risk are either very small or have few if any structures.”  Pasterick, supra note 52, 
at 129. 
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disaster relief, and mortgage insurance are not available for 
properties located in special flood hazard areas.65  To participate, a 
community must enact certain measures to help mitigate its flood 
risk.66  The requirements vary depending on whether a community is 
flood-prone, mudslide prone, subject to flood-related erosion, or 
some combination of these, and also increase in stages depending on 
the level of detail at which the area’s flood risks have been mapped.67  
Most importantly, the regulations require that a community pre-
approve new construction in flood-prone areas and that it do so only 
where the new development is designed to be flood-resistant in 
various ways.68  For instance, new construction in 100-year flood 
zones must be “designed (or modified) and adequately anchored to 
prevent flotation, collapse, or lateral movement of the structure” due 
to flooding and must be built with materials that are “resistant to 
flood damage.”69  When a FIRM shows an area’s base flood 
elevation, all new construction and “substantial improvements of 
residential structures” that occurs in special flood hazard areas after 
the FIRM is issued must be elevated above the base flood level.70  
The NFIP also requires that communities avoid development that will 
have the effect of worsening floods, such as development that would 
block stormwater drainage.71  Such are the requirements that apply to 
all communities that participate in the NFIP. 
Just how effective these requirements have been in helping to 
mitigate flood damage is a matter of debate.  Their most notable 
                                                 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 4106; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 8. 
 66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4022, 4102(c); 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(3). 
 67. 44 C.F.R. §§ 60.2, 60.3. 
 68. Id. § 60.3(a)(3). 
 69. Id. § 60.3(b). 
 70. Id. § 60.3(c)(2). The regulations define “substantial improvements” to mean 
improvements that cost 50 percent or more of the structure’s market value (when a 
structure has been damaged by flooding, its market value is its pre-flood value).  Id. 
§ 59.1.  During the rebuilding of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
many residents thus found that determinations of the amount of damage their 
homes had suffered carried dramatic consequences.  Homes that were more than 
50% damaged were required to be elevated above the base flood level, sometimes 
ten or fifteen feet above street level. See, e.g., Renee Peck, Elevated Houses 
Making a Mark on Post-Katrina New Orleans Landscape, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Aug. 23, 2008; Adam Nossiter, Rebuilding New Orleans, One Appeal 
at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006. 
 71. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c)(10). 
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feature is that they are entirely decentralized.  Rather than simply 
imposing regulations on everyone, the NFIP places the burden of 
establishing and enforcing these rules on individual communities.  
These requirements are in turn enforced by FEMA, which conducts 
reviews periodically to ensure that participating communities are in 
compliance.72  If FEMA determines that a community is not 
complying, it can be placed on probation and ultimately suspended 
from the program, which renders the community’s residents 
ineligible for coverage.73  FEMA performs site visits, however, at a 
relatively small percentage of participating communities each year, 
and most of the information it receives about compliance comes in 
the form of annual reports from the communities themselves.74 
Studies conducted over the years by academics, consultants, and 
FEMA itself have suggested that these enforcement mechanisms are 
not terribly effective.  One survey of a variety of communities in 
Louisiana revealed numerous instances in which communities fell far 
short of meeting their regulatory mandate.75  In one flood-prone 
community, local officials made “little or no effort to enforce the 
[NFIP’s] flood plain management and elevation requirements.”76  In 
another, a FEMA investigation concluded that local officials 
exhibited a “total lack of understanding” of the NFIP’s 
requirements.77  Another study attributed a quarter of the $16 billion 
in losses caused by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 to Dade County’s 
failure to enforce its own building code.78  The federal government 
has sued such communities, on the theory that their flagrant 
violations of the NFIP’s requirements amount to a breach of contract, 
but these suits have not been successful.79  Individuals have also sued 
                                                 
 72. Pasterick, supra note 52, at 131. 
 73. Id.; 44 C.F.R. § 59.24. 
 74. Houck, supra note 32, at 91-92. 
 75. See generally, Houck, supra note 32, at 91-114. 
 76. Id. at 101. 
 77. Id. at 99. 
 78. Burby, supra note 20, at 178. 
 79. See United States v. St. Bernard Parish, 756 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 
1985) (affirming dismissal of contractual claim and further holding that no implied 
right of action is available to the United States under the NFIP).  While it 
foreclosed the possibility of breach of contract suits against municipalities, the 
Fifth Circuit in United States v. St. Bernard Parish left open the possibility of a 
subrogation suit, in which an insurer pays its insured and then sues an entity it 
claims caused the losses.  See id. at 1128.  Nevertheless, the federal government 
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their communities for their failure to comply with NFIP requirements 
on a tort theory, but these suits have similarly failed.80 
It is also worth noting that the regulations do not require 
communities to restrict, let alone forbid, new construction in flood-
prone areas.81  Only by requiring that new structures be raised above 
base flood elevation do the regulations arguably impose an additional 
marginal cost on floodplain development, and this cost may well be 
outweighed by the availability of insurance to cover flood losses.  
Nevertheless, complying with the NFIP’s regulations does appear to 
help mitigate flood damage.  One analysis of losses from 1978 to 
1994 showed that structures built before 1975, when the NFIP’s base 
flood elevation rules went into effect, suffered about six times more 
damage than those built after 1975.82  Another report, by the 
Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee, found, in 
studying the 1993 flooding in the Midwest, that many communities 
there “actively discourage floodplain development” thanks to the 
increased costs associated with the NFIP’s floodplain management 
requirements.83 
As an additional incentive to help mitigate flood risks, the NFIP 
has also contained, since 1990, an optional, more burdensome set of 
requirements that communities can elect to implement in exchange 
for lower premiums.  This is known as the Community Rating 
                                                                                                                 
has not enjoyed success in pursuing such claims.  See Wesley Davis, Lessons 
Learned from the Flood Insurance ReMapping Controversy in Portland, Maine, 16 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 181, 203-04 (2010) (citing Gabler v. Regent Dev. Corp., 
470 So. 2d 149, 162 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (holding that proximate cause of 
losses was an “act of God”)). 
 80. See Gabler, 470 So. 2d at 162 (dismissing suit on the grounds that the 
damage was caused by “an act of God”); see also Timothy Kozlowski, Dams and 
Levees are Not Enough: The Case for Recognizing a Cause of Action Against Non-
Complying NFIP Communities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 245 
(2007). 
 81. See St. Amand, supra note 3, at 20. 
 82. Pasterick, supra note 52, at 132.  There may of course be other reasons for 
this discrepancy.  For instance, structures built since 1975 are by definition newer, 
and may simply be in better repair than older structures.  It may also be that newer 
structures are less likely to be located in flood plains for reasons having nothing to 
do with the NFIP, for instance because rivers are no longer the commercial hearts 
of most cities. 
 83. Id. (citing INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, 
SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 97 
(1994)). 
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System.84  Under the Community Rating System (“CRS”), 
communities are classified on a ten-point scale based on the number 
of points they earn for taking certain flood mitigation measures in 
pursuit of the CRS’s goals.  A class 10 community does nothing 
beyond what the NFIP requires and receives no discount on 
premiums, while a class 1 community must earn more than 4,500 
points and is entitled to a 45 percent discount on premiums for 
properties within a special flood hazard area and a 10 percent 
discount on premiums for properties not in a special flood hazard 
area.85 
The CRS lays out nineteen activities in four basic categories for 
which communities can earn points: (1) public information activities, 
which rewards communities that “advise people about the flood 
hazard, encourage the purchase of flood insurance, and provide 
information about ways to reduce flood damage;” (2) mapping and 
regulations, which rewards communities for, among other things, 
“preserving open space, protecting natural floodplain functions, 
enforcing higher regulatory standards, and managing stormwater;” 
(3) flood damage reduction activities, which rewards communities 
for “relocating or retrofitting flood-prone structures and maintaining 
drainage systems;” and finally, (4) “warning and response,” under 
which communities are rewarded for creating “flood warning and 
response programs.”86  For each of the nineteen activities that fall 
into these four groups, the CRS Coordinator’s Manual establishes a 
maximum number of points that can be earned.  Notably, the most 
valuable activities in terms of possible points are “open space 
                                                 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b) (authorizing the creation of the Community Rating 
System).  The provisions of the Community Rating System itself are laid out in a 
614-page FEMA publication called THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
COMMUNITY RATING SYSTEM COORDINATOR’S MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter CRS 
Coordinator’s Manual], available at http://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/8768.  Interestingly, the cover of the Manual features a 
photograph of a flooded bucolic landscape with a green lawn and a park bench in 
the foreground.  The manual explains that this photograph represents “the ultimate 
floodplain, from a community’s perspective: Nature follows its course with no 
threat to life or property.  The waterfront is a community asset where people can 
relax and enjoy the view.” Id. at ii.  This attitude reflects the CRS’s broader 
institutional goal of moving people out of floodplains rather than attempting to 
insulate them from the risks of flooding. 
 85. CRS Coordinator’s Manual, supra note 84, at 110-13. 
 86. Id. at 110-14. 
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regulation” and “higher regulatory standards,” followed by 
“acquisition and relocation” and “flood protection.”87 
According to FEMA, there are 1,200 communities in the 
Community Rating System, of which only one, Roseville, California, 
has attained a Class 1 rating.88  Indeed, only about 70 of the 1,200 
participating communities have a rating of Class 5 or better.89  While 
these numbers may sound low, they represent real progress.  As of 
1998, there were 912 communities participating in the CRS, of which 
only two had reached Class 5.90  The 1,200 communities in the 
Community Rating System today represent only 5 percent of the total 
number of communities that participate in the NFIP, but in this five 
percent of communities live approximately 67 percent of NFIP 
policyholders.91  These figures stand in marked contrast to the status 
quo that existed before the creation of the NFIP, when a 1958 study 
showed that “virtually no local governments in the United States had 
adopted building or zoning regulations to minimize flood losses.”92  
The substantial discounts available under the Community Rating 
System thus provide a very real incentive for communities to 
undertake various additional burdens in their efforts to mitigate flood 
risk.  Whether these measures have led to a meaningful reduction in 
losses due to flooding is an open question. 
C.  Insuring Against the Risk 
Once a community elects to participate in the NFIP, its residents 
become eligible to purchase flood insurance.  The NFIP’s provision 
of flood insurance at subsidized rates is the most controversial aspect 
of the program, and the source of the majority of its woes.  It is also, 
however, an aspect of the program that is often oversimplified and 
misunderstood.  The popular impression is that all NFIP 
                                                 
 87. Id. at 110-16. 
 88. About CRS, FLOODSMART.GOV, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/ 
pages/crs/community_rating_system.jsp (last updated Dec. 16, 2014). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Pasterick, supra note 52, at 137. 
 91. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 9.  Of course, as will be 
discussed below, the mere fact of a community’s participation does not mean that 
every property owner in the community has flood insurance. 
 92. Burby, supra note 20, at 178 (citing Francis C. Murphy, Regulating Flood 
Plain Development, U. Chi. Dep’t of Geography Research Paper No. 56 (1958)). 
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policyholders are paying subsidized rates.93  This is simply not true.  
In reality, the NFIP mandates that actuarial rates be charged in most 
instances.94  Biggert-Waters eliminated some of the exceptions to this 
rule, generating a dramatic response that led to the passage of the 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014.  In 
evaluating the viability and mechanics of the NFIP, it is useful to 
examine the details of how premiums are calculated. 
The NFIP creates two basic categories of premiums: “risk premium 
rates,” also known as “actuarial rates,” and “chargeable rates,” often 
referred to as “subsidized rates.”95  Actuarial rates are supposed to be 
actuarially sound in the sense that they are reflective of the risk faced 
by each property, plus the operating costs and expenses necessary to 
ensure that the program breaks even.96  Chargeable rates, in contrast, 
are designed to be lower than actuarial rates, and are set at a level 
that “can reasonably be charged to insureds in order to encourage 
them to purchase” flood insurance.97  Before the passage of Biggert-
Waters, chargeable rates applied to all properties located within the 
100-year flood zone that were constructed before the issuance of a 
FIRM (regardless of when either the policy or the property itself was 
purchased), as well as properties in the “emergency program,” the 
temporary bridge program that exists until a FIRM is issued.98  
Finally, a longstanding provision capped increases in rates at no more 
than 10 percent per year.99 
                                                 
 93. See, e.g., Kildow & Scorse, supra note 42 (“It is long past time for the 
government to stop subsidizing home and business owners who live and build in 
dangerous flood zones”). 
 94. The tendency to refer in sweeping language to all federal flood insurance as 
subsidized seems to stem from the fact that there is no private market for flood 
insurance, suggesting that it is simply too expensive to be provided at market rates.  
In actuality, the private market for flood insurance died due primarily to the dual 
problems of correlation and the difficulty of accurately evaluating the flood risk 
faced by individual properties.  See supra notes 47–49, 52. 
 95. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014, 4015; 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(1); 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 61.7(a). 
 97. 44 C.F.R. § 61.7(b); 42 U.S.C. § 4015(b)(2).  In practice, the chargeable 
rates that have been used are estimated to be about 38 percent of the actuarial rate 
that would reflect the full measure of risk faced by a particular property.  Pasterick, 
supra note 52, at 134. 
 98. 44 C.F.R. § 61.9; see infra Part III.E. 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 4015(e). 
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It is worth noting that the law does not mandate that particular 
rates be charged; these decisions are left to the discretion of FEMA.  
As the NFIP has evolved, FEMA’s view of what constitutes a 
“chargeable rate” has shifted.  In the 1970s the main objective was to 
encourage participation in the NFIP, and chargeable rates were quite 
low.100  In the 80s and 90s these rates were increased, with the aim of 
making the NFIP more financially sound.101  The percentage of 
properties paying chargeable rates has simultaneously decreased, 
going from about 75 percent in 1978 to about 35 percent in 1997.102 
D.  The NFIP’s Financial Troubles 
Of course, even though most policyholders do not pay subsidized 
rates, the NFIP itself is “subsidized” in various ways.  The subsidy 
provided to pre-FIRM properties located in a 100-year flood zone in 
the form of an artificially low “chargeable rate” has long been a 
source of controversy, and is widely seen as a major contributor to 
the NFIP’s infamous financial problems.103  As of 2010, the GAO 
estimated that about 22 percent of all NFIP policyholders paid 
subsidized rates, which were about 35 to 40 percent of what their 
actuarial rates would be.104  According to FEMA, properties paying 
subsidized rates, which were entitled to do so because they are 
located in 100-year flood zones but pre-date the issuance of a FIRM 
(which triggers the NFIP’s design regulations), experience as much 
as five times more flood damage than new structures paying actuarial 
rates.105  In addition to the subsidized, “chargeable” rates created by 
                                                 
 100. Pasterick, supra note 52, at 134. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES 4 (2010) (testimony before congress) [hereinafter GAO, 
Continued Actions]; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12, 
FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 
(2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FLOOD INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR 
ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SUBSIDIZED PREMIUM RATES ON THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, GAO-09-20 (2008). 
 104. GAO, Continued Actions, at 6. 
 105. Id.  In a way, this figure is an indication of the success of the mitigation 
requirements the NFIP imposes on post-FIRM properties in 100-year flood zones.  
Another, more optimistic, way of framing the issue is to observe that properties 
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statute, FEMA has allowed certain properties that have been 
remapped into riskier flood zones to continue paying their old, 
“grandfathered” rates, creating another set of policyholders who pay 
less than their actuarial cost.106 
There are, in addition, myriad other factors that have contributed to 
the program’s financial shortfalls.  One of the most frequently cited is 
the so-called “repetitive loss problem,” which is based on the 
observation that certain properties account for a wildly 
disproportionate share of the NFIP’s expenses.  Repetitive loss 
properties, which are properties that have had two or more flood 
insurance claims of $10,000 or more in ten years, account for about 1 
percent of policies but 30 percent of the program’s losses.107  Despite 
attempts by Congress to mitigate this problem, it remains a major 
financial drag on the NFIP.108 
There is also the ongoing difficulty of accurately quantifying the 
risk faced by policyholders.  Some have suggested that the 
methodology the NFIP uses to measure risk is fundamentally flawed.  
As has been seen, much hinges on the use, as a statistical benchmark, 
of a flood that has a one percent chance of occurring in any given 
year.  Category 3, 4, and 5 hurricanes are excluded from the 
program’s basic benchmark of risk, since they are too statistically 
unlikely to qualify as 100-year floods.109  Areas that would flood 
during such storms, but not during a 100-year flood, are thus not 
                                                                                                                 
constructed in flood plains that are subject to the NFIP’s mitigation requirements 
experience far less flood damage than their pre-FIRM neighbors. 
 106. Id. at 7. 
 107. Id.  A number of these properties also receive subsidized rates, heightening 
their deleterious fiscal impact.  Id.  In one example cited by the New York Times, a 
home in Biloxi, Mississippi that was worth $183,000 flooded 15 times in the course 
of a decade, receiving flood insurance payments totaling $1.47 million.  Eric 
Lipton, Felicity Barringer, & Mary Williams Walsh, Federal Flood Insurance 
Program, Already Fragile, Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at A1. 
 108. See The Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-264 § 2, 118 Stat. 712, 713.  The 2004 Act provided funding 
for States or communities to undertake efforts to reduce the risk posed by repetitive 
loss properties.  These measures included elevation, relocation, demolition, and 
floodproofing.  Id.  § 102, 118 Stat. 715.  The act also included a provision 
increasing the premiums for owners of repetitive loss properties who refused an 
offer of mitigation.  Id.  § 102(h), 118 Stat. 717.  Nevertheless, the GAO noted in 
2010 that despite these efforts, “the number of repetitive loss properties has 
continued to grow.” GAO, Continued Actions, supra note 103, at 8. 
 109. Burby, supra note 20, at 177. 
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considered to be “special flood hazard areas” under the NFIP.110  It 
has been suggested that using a more conservative benchmark, such 
as the 500-year flood, would be more appropriate.111  FEMA was 
also historically prevented from taking into account long-term 
erosion resulting from climate change and rising sea levels in 
updating flood maps and setting premium rates.112 
The net result of the NFIP’s various financial shortcomings has 
been enormous debt.  The program is statutorily entitled to ask the 
Treasury for loans when it experiences shortfalls,113 and it has made 
liberal use of this privilege.  As of November 2012, just after 
Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast, FEMA owed the Treasury 
roughly $20 billion, and had not repaid any principal on its 
outstanding debt since 2010.114  In January 2013, Congress increased 
the NFIP’s borrowing authority to $30.4 billion after it became clear 
that the program would have to take on more debt to pay claims from 
Hurricane Sandy.115  The NFIP’s losses, the GAO has found, have 
created “substantial financial exposure for the federal government 
and U.S. taxpayers,” landing the program a spot on the GAO’s “high 
risk list,” where it has remained since 2006.116 
Indeed, the degree to which the NFIP is actuarially unsound, and 
the degree to which flood losses are being borne by American 
taxpayers generally rather than NFIP policyholders in the form of 
premiums, is nicely represented by the size of the NFIP’s debt to the 
                                                 
 110. See supra note 53. 
 111. See Burby, supra note 20, at 177 (describing proposal by the Association of 
State Floodplain Managers).  Indeed, NFIP claims in 2005, which resulted 
primarily from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, totaled $17.7 billion.  Lipton, 
et al., supra note 107, at A1. 
 112. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-283, HIGH-RISK SERIES: 
AN UPDATE 263 (2013) [hereinafter GAO, High-Risk Series].  Another feature of 
the NFIP that has drawn attention is its inability to purchase reinsurance, which is 
particularly important to private insurers in protecting against catastrophic risks.  
GAO, Continued Actions, supra note 103, at 5. 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 4016. 
 114. GAO, High-Risk Series, supra note 106, at 261. 
 115. See id.; see also Lipton, et al., supra note 112, at A1 (reporting that 
payments associated with Hurricane Sandy were expected to reach $7 billion, while 
the NFIP could not at that time borrow more than another $3 billion).  In the fall of 
2012, the interest payments on the NFIP’s debt to the treasury alone ranged from 
$90 to $750 million per year, depending on interest rates.  Id. 
 116. GAO, High-Risk Series, supra note 112, at 261. 
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treasury.  The NFIP has historically created a net flow of money from 
taxpayers to policyholders, effectively subsidizing owners of flood-
prone property by artificially reducing the magnitude of the risk they 
bear.  This subsidy artificially decreases the costs of flood-prone 
development, encouraging the very behavior the NFIP’s mitigation 
provisions are meant to prevent. 
E.  Efforts at Reform: Biggert-Waters and its Fate 
Congress took a major stab at solving some of the NFIP’s financial 
problems in the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 
(“Biggert-Waters”), which eliminated subsidized premiums for 
certain categories of policyholders.117  The law mandated that 
actuarial rates be charged to (1) second homes, (2) a broad category 
of repetitive loss properties, (3) businesses, and (4) any properties 
that undergo substantial flood damage or improvements after the 
act’s enactment.118  Biggert-Waters also eliminated subsidized rates 
for newly purchased properties and newly purchased policies, as well 
as policies reinstated after having lapsed.119  The practice of 
“grandfathering” old rates was also eliminated by Biggert-Waters.  
Where previously a homeowner could continue paying a 
grandfathered rate even if a FIRM was revised to show that his or her 
property faced a higher risk, such properties would now be required 
to pay the full actuarial rate as shown on the newly revised map.120  
The final change that Biggert-Waters effected in the calculation of 
rates was an increase in the cap on annual rate increases, from 10 to 
20 percent (and to 25 percent for repetitive loss properties).121 
                                                 
 117. Biggert-Waters Flood Ins. Reform Act of 2012, § 100205, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, Title II, 126 Stat. 916 (July 6, 2012) [hereinafter Biggert-Waters].  The bill 
enjoyed support from both fiscal conservatives, concerned by the NFIP’s drain on 
taxpayers, and environmentalists, who saw higher flood insurance premiums as 
reflective of the true costs of climate change. 
 118. Id.  § 100205(a)(1)(A).  Repetitive loss properties were defined as before, 
but a new catchall provision was added removing subsidized rates for any property 
“that has incurred flood-related damage in which the cumulative amounts of 
payments under this title equaled or exceeded the fair market value of such 
property.”  Id. 
 119. Id.  § 100205(a)(1)(B). 
 120. Id.  § 100207. 
 121. Id. § 100205(c).  Biggert-Waters also contained a provision emphasizing 
that a flood insurance policy purchased from a private insurer (rather than from the 
NFIP) could satisfy the lender mandate, provided it met certain technical 
2015] FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 193 
Thus, after Biggert-Waters, the only policies for which subsidized 
rates would continue to apply indefinitely were for pre-FIRM 
primary residences in 100-year flood zones, so long as the property 
was not sold or substantially improved, did not incur repetitive flood 
losses, and the policy was not allowed to lapse.  The elimination of 
grandfathered rates also meant that Biggert-Waters had a profound 
impact on many post-FIRM properties.  Even though these had 
nominally been subject to actuarial rates rather than subsidized rates, 
their rates in many cases were based on old FIRMs and so were much 
lower than the actuarial rates required by current estimates of the risk 
they faced.  Under Biggert-Waters, these rates were set to rise as 
well. 
Many of the changes wrought by Biggert-Waters went into effect 
on October 1, 2013, and as its impact began to be felt, a tide of 
political opposition rose.  Homeowners in many areas received 
notices informing them that their premium payments would be 
increasing, often dramatically.122  In many examples cited in the 
media, premiums went from being a relatively minor part of a 
homeowner’s financial life to a major expense rivaling or even 
exceeding the cost of mortgage payments.123  People who had lived 
in their homes for decades, particularly those in post-FIRM structures 
who had been paying grandfathered rates, suddenly found themselves 
unable to afford their flood insurance payments.  The increased 
premiums also began to drive down real estate prices in certain areas, 
since the sale of a pre-FIRM building would trigger new premiums at 
actuarial rates.124  Flood insurance “reform,” which in this case meant 
                                                                                                                 
requirements.  Id. § 100239(a)(4), 126 Stat. 959.  Legislation to relax these 
requirements has recently been proposed, seeking to “clarify that any private flood 
insurance policy accepted by a State” satisfies the lender mandate.  Flood Insurance 
Market Parity and Modernization Act of 2014, S. 2381, 113th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(2014). 
 122. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Campbell Robertson, Cost of Flood Insurance 
Rises, Along with Worries N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at A14. 
 123. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law is Target of Both 
Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, at A14 (“Diane Mazzuca . . . had been paying 
$595 annually for flood insurance on her $90,000 home.  After Biggert-Waters 
ended federal flood insurance subsidies last June, she got an updated bill — for 
$4,492”). 
 124. Alvarez & Robertson, supra note 122 (reporting that in some areas “home 
sales have come to a near standstill”).  The Times also reported that sellers were 
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undoing reforms barely a year old, quickly became a salient political 
issue in places like Louisiana, and a grassroots anti-Biggert-Waters 
campaign was born.125  By the beginning of 2014, the effort to “gut” 
Biggert-Waters enjoyed strong bipartisan support.126 
This campaign achieved its goal on March 21, 2014, just twenty 
months after Biggert-Waters was passed, as the President signed into 
law the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014.127  
While previous versions of the law had simply delayed 
implementation of Biggert-Waters’s premium reforms, the version 
that ultimately became law undid many of them altogether.128  The 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act repealed the 
provisions of Biggert-Waters that had eliminated subsidized rates for 
                                                                                                                 
“hoping for wealthy cash buyers who are not required to carry flood insurance,” a 
feature of the program that will be discussed in more detail below.  Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, Political Foes Mary Landrieu and Bill Cassidy Are 
on the Same Side on Flood Insurance, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, January 9, 
2014; Editorial, House Needs to Provide Real Relief on Flood Insurance Rates, 
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, February 16, 2014; Ben Myers, Louisiana 
Politicians Praise New Flood Insurance Law, With Eye on Next Steps, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, March 24, 2014; see also Verchick & Johnson, supra 
note 3, at 711-12. 
 126. Davenport, supra note 123.  Maxine Waters herself became a leader of the 
effort to rewrite the legislation she sponsored: “Never in our wildest dreams did we 
think the premium increases would be what they appear to be today,” she 
explained.  Id.  As some commentators have observed, this claim is dubious at best.  
Verchick & Johnson, supra note 3, at 711-12.  The GAO had long predicted that 
the elimination of subsidized rates would lead to such problems, and recommended 
offering subsidized premiums based on financial need.  Id. at 712 (citing U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office, Options for Addressing the Financial Impact of 
Subsidized Premium Rates on the National Flood Insurance Program (2008)). 
 127. Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020. 
 128. The House and the Senate originally passed two different versions of the 
law.  The Senate, perceiving the main problem to be the elimination of 
grandfathered rates based on hastily prepared new FIRMs, simply delayed Biggert-
Waters’s rate increases until either the completion of an affordability study or six 
months after a certification from FEMA that it had come up with “technically 
credible flood hazard data in all areas where [FIRMs] are prepared or updated.”  S. 
1926, 113th Cong., § 103(a)(3); see also Cong. Rec. S613-627 (Jan. 30, 2014).  
The Senate version was passed and sent to the House on January 31, but the House 
proceeded with its own version, which was finally passed by the Senate and signed 
into law.  See H.R. 3370. 
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certain policies.129  More specifically, the Act repealed the provisions 
of Biggert-Waters that eliminated subsidized rates for all new 
policies and for all policies on newly purchased properties.130 
The Act also repealed the portion of Biggert-Waters that 
eliminated grandfathered rates.  Under Biggert-Waters, rates were to 
be adjusted for “any property located in an area that is participating 
in the [NFIP] . . . to accurately reflect the current risk of flood to such 
property.”131  This provision was eliminated.132  The Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act did, however, clarify that new policies on 
properties not located in 100-year flood zones would no longer enjoy 
protected grandfathered rates going forward if FEMA later remapped 
them into 100-year flood zones.133  In other words, all policies on 
properties outside 100-year flood zones purchased after the Act’s 
enactment would be subject to increased premiums if the properties 
they insured were later determined by FEMA to lie within special 
flood hazard areas, with any increase to be phased in gradually.134  
The reinstatement of preexisting grandfathered rates and subsidized 
rates for new policies and newly purchased properties was aimed at 
eliminating Biggert-Waters’ impacts on the real estate market, so that 
prospective buyers of flood-prone properties could rest assured that 
they would continue paying subsidized rates, or would be able to get 
new policies at old, subsidized rates, at least for properties already 
determined to lie within 100-year flood zones.  The new law also 
limited rate increases on all properties to no more than 18 percent 
each year.135  Congress was able to conclude that the new Flood 
Insurance Affordability Act would not worsen the NFIP’s financial 
condition thanks to the inclusion of a $25 annual surcharge on all 
                                                 
 129. Homeowner Flood Ins. Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 3, 
4, 128 Stat. 1021-22 (2014). 
 130. Id.  § 3, 128 Stat. 1021-22 (striking portions of Biggert-Waters § 100205, 
Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 917, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1) - (2)). 
 131. Biggert-Waters, § 100207. 
 132. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 § 4, Pub. L. No. 
113-89, 128 Stat. 1022. 
 133. Id.  § 6, 128 Stat. 1023. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  § 5, 128 Stat. 1022. 
196 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXVI 
policyholders and a $250 surcharge on policies for business 
properties and second homes.136 
From a policy perspective, the Flood Insurance Affordability Act is 
a minor disaster.  Assuming it is in fact correct that the across the 
board surcharges make up for the loss in premiums to the NFIP, the 
act nonetheless does much to hamper the ability of flood insurance to 
incentivize mitigation of the country’s overall flood risk.  High 
insurance premiums had the ability to dissuade prospective 
purchasers from buying flood-prone properties.  While this financial 
toll was obviously hard on those properties’ owners, for those who 
chose not to buy it could have meant a life free from flooding.  
Subsidized rates do much to hinder the ability of flood insurance 
premiums to act as a kind of warning mechanism, as will be 
discussed in more detail below.  The continuation of grandfathered 
rates has a similarly distorting effect on the ability of flood insurance 
premiums to incentivize mitigation activity.  After the bill’s passage, 
homeowners could rejoice that they would no longer need to elevate 
their homes in search of more affordable premiums.137  Lost in the 
jubilation was the fact that by elevating, a home might be dry through 
the next flood instead of several feet underwater.  Still, the 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act did leave in place 
some of Biggert-Waters’s reforms, notably its elimination of 
subsidized rates for second homes, businesses, repetitive loss 
properties, and properties that undergo substantial damage or 
improvements. 
F.  Requiring Participation: The Lender Mandate 
Efforts to raise rates have always faced the specter of adverse 
selection.  If FEMA raises rates closer to actuarially sound levels, the 
thinking goes, people will simply choose not to purchase flood 
                                                 
 136. Id.  § 8, 128 Stat. 1023-24; see also Cong. Rec. H2134 (Mar. 4, 2014) 
(remarks of rep. Hensarling) (noting that H.R. 3370 is “technically PAYGO 
compliant”). 
 137. See, e.g., Annie Linsky, Good News: The Government Will No Longer 
Make You Put Your House on Stilts, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 14, 2014, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-14/good-news-the-
government-will-no-longer-make-you-put-your-house-on-stilts. 
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insurance, sending the program into ever deeper financial straits.138  
Theoretically at least, the people most likely to opt out of the 
program as rates increase are those who face (or at least perceive 
themselves to face) the lowest risk, leaving behind a riskier, and 
therefore more expensive, pool of policyholders.139 
The source of this problem is the fact that individuals are largely 
free to decline to purchase flood insurance if it does not seem 
appealing to them.  While the NFIP does include a mechanism that 
forces certain people to purchase policies, it is underinclusive, 
underenforced, and based on an erroneous understanding of the 
constitutional limits on Congress’s power, with the result that the 
percentage of individuals in flood-prone areas who have flood 
insurance is often tragically low. 
This mechanism, known as the “lender mandate,” requires 
individuals to purchase flood insurance on properties located within a 
100-year flood zone whenever a “regulated lending institution” 
provides a mortgage secured by that property.140  In fact, it would be 
more accurate to say that the statute requires lenders to require 
borrowers to purchase flood insurance.  The statute directs federal 
entities that regulate lending institutions to promulgate regulations to 
this effect, and they have.141  Essentially, all new loans secured by 
property in 100-year flood zones are supposed to carry with them the 
requirement that the borrower obtain flood insurance. 
As is evident, the scope of the lender mandate is limited.  It does 
not require that anyone outside a 100-year flood zone purchase flood 
insurance, despite the fact that, according to FEMA, properties 
outside these areas have historically accounted for about 25 percent 
of NFIP claims.142  It also does not apply in non-participating 
                                                 
 138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1063T, NATIONAL 
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS 
FINANCIAL & OPERATIONS ISSUES 3 (2010). 
 139. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at n.20. 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b).  The amount of insurance required is the lesser of (1) 
the maximum amount of coverage under the NFIP, (2) the outstanding principal 
balance of the loan, or (3) the insurable value of the structure.  Id. 
 141. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at n.56 (citing regulations). 
 142. Id. at 14.  Other estimates suggest that even this figure may be too low.  One 
study, for instance, estimated that 83 percent of losses from hurricane winds and 
flooding resulted from Category 3, 4, and 5 storms, all of which are too infrequent 
to qualify as 100-year flood events. Burby, supra note 20, at 177.  Of course, this 
number does not isolate the percentage of such damage that occurred outside 100-
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communities, regardless of their flood risk, since individuals in those 
communities are not eligible to purchase flood insurance in the first 
place.143  It also bears emphasizing that the lender mandate does not 
apply to anyone who owns property without a mortgage.144  Overall, 
it has been estimated that the lender mandate applies to about 50 to 
60 percent of single family homes in 100-year flood zones.145 
Even where the lender mandate does require that individuals 
purchase flood insurance, enforcement is often lax.  It was not until 
1994 that the NFIP explicitly required that flood insurance be 
maintained for the life of the loan at issue.146  Moreover, the lender 
mandate must be enforced by whichever agency has direct oversight 
of the lender in question.147  To a surprising degree, banks have failed 
to require that their debtors carry flood insurance.148  A 2006 study 
                                                                                                                 
year flood zones, but it does call into question the propriety of using the 100-year 
flood as the statistical benchmark for requiring flood insurance. 
 143. It should be noted, however, that the number of individuals facing a special 
flood hazard in non-participating communities is probably quite small.  See supra 
note 64.  Originally, regulated lending institutions were prohibited from lending in 
communities that did not participate in the NFIP.  This rule was removed by statute 
in 1977.  See Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
128 § 703(a), 91 Stat. 1144 (1977). 
 144. In recent years, the share of homes purchased without a mortgage has 
increased.  One study estimated that more than half of homes sold in 2012 were “all 
cash” sales. Nick Timaros, Report: Half of All Homes Are Being Purchased with 
Cash, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 2013, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2013/08/15/report-half-of-all-homes-are-being-
purchased-with-cash/; see also Julia Zhu, An Astonishing Share of Homebuyers Are 
Paying All Cash, NPR, Jan. 24, 2014, available at 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014/01/23/265264740/an-astonishing-share-of-
home-buyers-are-paying-all-cash. 
 145. Lloyd Dixon, et al., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S 
MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xvii (RAND 
2006). 
 146. Reigle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-325 § 522(a), 108 Stat. 2160, 2257. 
 147. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 15. 
 148. See Rachel Lisotta, In Over our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National 
Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. 
MAR. L. J. 511, 518 (2012).  One possible explanation for banks’ failure to ensure 
that borrowers purchase and maintain flood insurance is that mortgages are 
frequently sold and securitized on the secondary market.  See Scales, supra note 46, 
at n.68 and accompanying text. 
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by RAND estimated compliance with the lender mandate at between 
75 and 80 percent nationally, with significant local variation.149 
Nevertheless, the lender mandate does make a difference.  The 
same RAND study estimated that only about 20 percent of homes not 
subject to the lender mandate carried flood insurance.150  Overall, 
about half of all single-family homes in 100-year flood zones have 
NFIP policies, while outside the 100-year flood zone, the NFIP’s 
market penetration is estimated to be only about 1 percent.151  The 
magnitude of the problem is often revealed by disasters themselves.  
In St. Bernard Parish, which was decimated by Hurricane Katrina, 
only 57.7 percent of homes had flood insurance before the storm.152  
In Orleans Parish, of which about 80 percent lay underwater in the 
days after Katrina,153 only 40 percent of homeowners had flood 
insurance.154  Along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, which was 
virtually wiped out by storm surges, less than 10 percent of homes 
had flood insurance.155 
This weak participation undermines the NFIP in several crucially 
important ways.  First, it deprives the program of valuable premiums 
that could be used to help it achieve its age-old mandate of self-
sufficiency.  Second, it removes the safety net that flood insurance 
provides, leaving the uninsured dependent on uncertain federal aid in 
the wake of major disasters, and increasing the pressure on the 
federal government to provide such aid.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, allowing individuals to decline to purchase flood 
insurance deprives the program of its vital signaling function, its 
ability to force individuals to acknowledge and internalize the risks 
they face by placing a regular, yearly dollar figure on that risk.  This 
last feature represents the NFIP’s, and indeed the country’s, greatest 
hope of discouraging risky coastal development as a matter of policy 
                                                 
 149. Dixon, et al., supra note 145, at xvii. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at xvi. 
 152. Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of 
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835, 
877 (2006). 
 153. See Jere Longman & Swell Chan, Flooding Recedes in New Orleans; U.S. 
Inquiry is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A1. 
 154. Jerry & Roberts, supra note 152, at 877. 
 155. Scales, supra note 46, at 15. 
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at the federal level.  It is for these reasons that an individual mandate 
for flood insurance is so badly needed. 
IV.  SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF FLOOD-PRONE DEVELOPMENT: AN 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR THE NFIP 
The NFIP has been plagued by dueling problems since its 
inception.  On the one hand, political pressures and the fear of 
adverse selection have driven the program to provide rates that are in 
many cases cheaper than they should be.  This is, in a sense, in 
keeping with the goal of providing the safety net of flood insurance 
by ensuring that it remains attractive to owners of flood-prone 
properties.  On the other hand, by making flood insurance cheaper 
than it should be, the NFIP creates a moral hazard that undermines its 
goal of helping reduce the nation’s aggregate flood risk.  Even 
though it requires the implementation of a complex set of mitigation 
measures, by subsidizing coastal development the NFIP has actually 
coaxed more people into harm’s way, even while it attempts to blunt 
the force of that harm.  This problematic tension is in a sense baked 
in to the NFIP,156 and has led to calls for its wholesale elimination, 
particularly as it becomes clear that climate change will only 
exacerbate the various flood risks we face.  To accommodate these 
competing goals, the NFIP must strike a balance that avoids the 
opposing perils of providing such a robust safety net that it ends up 
making life in a flood-prone area more attractive, and making 
participation in the program so burdensome that it drives away 
potential insureds.   
In this Section, I will argue that requiring that owners of property 
in flood-prone areas hold flood insurance would make this balance 
much easier to strike.  Part IV.A discusses the details of this 
proposal, including the scope of its application and its constitutional 
                                                 
 156. The danger of creating a moral hazard by providing subsidized flood 
insurance has been a primary concern since before the program’s creation, when a 
federal task force on flood control policy observed that if “insurance were used to 
subsidize new capital investment, it would aggravate flood damages and constitute 
gross public irresponsibility.” Communication from the President of the United 
States Transmitting a Report by the Task Force on Federal Flood Control Policy, 
H.R. Doc No. 465, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 18 (1966).  To counteract this problem, 
the report suggested that “owners of subsidized development [be] precluded from 
rebuilding destroyed or obsolete structures on the flood plain.”  Id.  This became a 
feature of the NFIP, although in a much weaker form.  See supra note 70. 
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basis.  Part IV.B suggests that an individual mandate would help the 
program escape its financial straits by increasing the pool of 
premiums available.  Part IV.C argues that requiring all owners of 
flood-prone property to hold insurance would strengthen the 
important safety net the NFIP provides, reducing pressure on 
Congress to provide massive relief programs in the wake of major 
floods.  Finally, Part IV.D argues that with an individual mandate, 
and with premiums set at actuarial levels, the NFIP could solve its 
moral hazard problem and become an important tool for 
discouraging, to an efficient degree, ownership of flood-prone 
properties.  In this sense, insurance can act as a form of land use 
regulation, one that is more predictable and efficient than traditional 
nuisance law while also being more nuanced and flexible than 
zoning. 
A.  What an Individual Mandate for Flood Insurance Might Look 
Like 
At its most basic level, an individual mandate for flood insurance 
would simply require that every owner of property in a 100-year 
flood zone purchase and maintain flood insurance.  This system 
would do away with the NFIP’s current reliance on the lender 
mandate as well as its distinction between pre- and post-FIRM 
properties.  There is, after all, no policy reason for requiring that only 
properties with mortgages carry flood insurance.  It seems, rather, 
that the lender mandate was motivated by a desire to avoid raising the 
issue of whether Congress had the constitutional power to require 
individuals to purchase flood insurance.157  Without any link to 
whether or not the property is encumbered by a mortgage, there 
would no longer be any reason to leave enforcement of the mandate 
in the hands of banks and their regulators, which have not been very 
effective in this role.158  Far better, it would seem, would be a tax-
based system like that used to ensure compliance with the individual 
mandate for health insurance. 
                                                 
 157. See Florida v. United States, 648 F.3d 1235, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(arguing that Congress’s failure to implement an individual mandate for flood 
insurance is evidence that it did not believe it had the power to do so).  The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sebelius makes clear that an individual 
mandate would be permissible if structured as a tax.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012). 
 158. See supra notes 146-149. 
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There is, similarly, no longer any justification for distinguishing 
between properties on the basis of whether they pre- or post-date the 
issuance of a FIRM.  The reason that pre-FIRM properties currently 
enjoy subsidized, “chargeable” rates is that only post-FIRM 
properties are required to be elevated above base flood level.159  (Pre-
FIRM properties, which sit below base flood level, thus face a much 
higher risk, and would be required to pay much higher rates if those 
rates reflected their actuarial risk.)  With an individual mandate, there 
would be no need to coax such properties into the program with 
cheap premiums.  There is no other justification for granting owners 
of pre-FIRM properties an entitlement to subsidized rates. 
It makes sense, instead, to account for any fairness concerns by 
reducing the cost of flood insurance for homeowners who cannot 
afford it.  Better to provide a break on premiums based on financial 
need than on the age of one’s house.  The danger here, however, is 
that making flood insurance too cheap for low-income homeowners 
would have the effect of encouraging the poor to settle in especially 
risky areas.  The fallout from Biggert-Waters has already shown that 
flood insurance premiums can have a significant impact on real estate 
prices.160  If a neighborhood faces a particularly acute flood risk, it 
may be that mandatory flood insurance premiums are so high that no 
one who is required to pay them could afford to live there, leading to 
a drop in prices.  By exempting low-income homeowners from 
paying flood insurance, the individual mandate would effectively 
                                                 
 159. This distinction is natural enough; it would not be feasible to require at the 
stroke of a pen that every existing structure be elevated above base flood level. 
 160. See, e.g., Jodi Schwan, Flood Insurance Puts Damper on Market, ARGUS 
LEADER (Sioux Falls, SD), Feb. 28, 2014, available at 
http://www.argusleader.com/article/20140228/BJUPDATES/302270005/Flood-
insurance-puts-damper-market; Kathleen Lynn, North Jersey Homeowners 
Trapped in Flood Zones Looking for Help from Feds, THE RECORD (Hackensack, 
NJ), Feb. 25, 2014, available at http://www.northjersey.com/real-estate/rising-
flood-insurance-premiums-make-homes-impossible-to-sell-1.735866; Jeff Frantz, 
As Flood Insurance Gets More Expensive, Experts Predict Lower Home Values, 
Fewer Sales, More Foreclosures, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 23, 2014, 
available at http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/01/national_flood_ 
insurance_progr_3.html; Nick Malawskey, Family Wants to Move On, but 
Creekside House Isn’t Selling; Agent Blames Flood Insurance Rates, PATRIOT-
NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 24, 2014, available at http://www. 
pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/01/flood_insurance_homeowners_sto_3.htm
l. 
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increase their incentive to move to a risky area, by providing for free 
something that would represent a major expense of owning such 
properties for everyone else. 
One potential solution to this problem would be to stop short of 
making flood insurance entirely free for low-income individuals and 
to tie premiums to a percentage of income rather than to the actuarial 
risk faced by the property.  Homeowners with incomes below a 
certain threshold would thus be required to pay the lower of the 
actuarial cost of the flood insurance on their property or some 
percentage of their income.  This approach would avoid forcing the 
poor out of their homes, but would retain enough of the cost 
associated with flood insurance to keep risky areas from becoming 
disproportionately attractive to those who cannot afford to pay 
actuarial rates. 
More could also be made of the NFIP’s “buyout” program.  The 
buyout program makes federal funds available to cover up to 75 
percent of the cost of purchasing insured, flood-damaged homes, at a 
price that is the greater of (1) the purchase price paid by the current 
owner, (2) the amount of any outstanding mortgage on the property, 
or (3) the value of the property before it was last flooded.161  Once 
the property has been acquired, it must remain open space forever.162  
Notably, the burden is on states to set up such programs and receive 
and process applications from individuals.  There is no standing 
buyout offer from the federal government, nor is there any way to 
apply for a buyout from FEMA directly.163  Making buyouts 
available to all policyholders who face, say, an increase in their 
premiums of more than a certain percentage would help ease the 
burden of homeowners whose properties stand to lose value as flood 
insurance premiums rise.  For those without the resources to move 
elsewhere, it could provide an invaluable lifeline.164 
Why keep the line between properties in the 100-year flood zone 
and those outside it, and require that only the former carry flood 
                                                 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 4102a.  Local governments are explicitly barred from using 
eminent domain to acquire properties.  44 C.F.R. § 80.11(a). 
 162. 44 C.F.R. § 80.11(f). 
 163. Id.  § 80.5; see also FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Assistance – Property 
Acquisition (Buyouts), https://www.fema.gov/application-development-
process/hazard-mitigation-assistance-property-acquisition-buyouts. 
 164. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of 
Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 295, 346 (2003). 
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insurance?  As many have pointed out, the 100-year flood zone is a 
crude and sometimes wildly misleading metric for gauging flood risk, 
and it is certainly not the case that properties outside the zone face no 
flood risk at all.165  It may well make sense to make the 500-year 
flood the NFIP’s statistical baseline.166  There are, however, several 
reasons to stop short of simply requiring that everyone purchase flood 
insurance, regardless of what flood zone they inhabit.167  First, 
estimating the national flood risk at the level of individual properties 
is a gargantuan undertaking, one that took FEMA years to 
complete.168  As flood risks change, whether due to erosion, 
subsidence, or sea level rise, FEMA must update its risk maps, a 
critically important and costly enterprise.  There is value in 
continuing to use a framework into which so much has been invested, 
and that has the benefit of decades of revision and refinement behind 
it.  Second, and more importantly, stopping short of requiring 
universal coverage creates a sharp line, with those required to pay for 
flood insurance separated from the rest, instead of infinite gradations 
applicable to everyone.  Because flood risk, unlike health risk, is 
something that one can essentially avoid entirely, it makes sense to 
strengthen the incentive to avoid purchasing flood-prone property by 
drawing a bright line around those who face a certain level of risk, 
however imperfect that line may be. 
B.  Easing the NFIP’s Financial Problems 
Incorporating an individual mandate into the NFIP would do much 
to help mitigate the program’s notorious financial problems.  By 
increasing the number of policyholders, an individual mandate would 
                                                 
 165. See supra notes 109-111.  In its report on coastal risk on the East and Gulf 
Coasts, the National Research Council pointed out that “[t]here is no solid basis of 
evidence to justify a default 1 percent annual chance (100-year) design level of 
coastal risk reduction.”  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 6.  The 
report went on to note that this baseline “was established for management 
purposes, not to achieve an optimal balance between risk and benefits,” and that 
there is “no evidence that reducing risk to a 1 percent annual-chance event is in the 
best interests of society or that this level is necessarily acceptable to the general 
public.”  Id. 
 166. See supra note 111. 
 167. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 7, 49-55 (proposing a system of 
mandated universal coverage for flood insurance, with premiums paid through tax 
withholding). 
 168. See Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 332-36. 
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increase the pool of premiums available to the NFIP, helping spread 
the risk across a larger pool of insureds.  It would also eliminate the 
adverse selection problem, in which those who perceive themselves 
to face lower flood risk drop out of the program, leaving behind an 
ever-riskier pool of policyholders.  In the early years of the program, 
dismal participation by communities and individuals led Congress to 
pass a series of reforms aimed at making flood insurance more 
enticing, some of which plague the NFIP to this day.169  Without the 
constant threat of adverse selection, the NFIP would have more 
freedom to raise rates to actuarial levels without fearing a mass 
exodus.170  Of course, more policyholders means more premiums, but 
it also means more claims that must be paid in the event of a flood.  
To what extent would increasing the number of participants in the 
NFIP truly help the program financially? 
In answering this question, much depends on the extent of the 
adverse selection problem in flood insurance.  If those who choose 
not to purchase flood insurance are in fact statistically less likely to 
experience flooding, then getting them back into the program would 
help improve the pool of policyholders from an actuarial perspective.  
An analogy can be drawn to the recent debate over the individual 
mandate in the Affordable Care Act.  The health insurance market 
faced a similar adverse selection problem: healthy young people were 
more likely to simply go without health insurance, and insurers found 
themselves struggling without their valuable premiums.171  Similarly, 
                                                 
 169. Id. at 337-38. 
 170. The political reaction to increased rates, on the other hand, would likely be 
even more intense than it is now.  As explained below, however, there are reasons 
to see this as a positive development both for the program and for the country’s 
overall exposure to flood risk.  See infra text at notes 209-211. 
 171. The passage of the Affordable Care Act was expected to exacerbate this 
effect dramatically, as it both reduced the degree to which insurance companies 
could charge higher premiums based on individual risk factors and guaranteed that 
those who became sick and sought insurance would be able to get coverage for 
preexisting conditions.  See Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585, Brief for America’s Health Ins. Plans, et al. as Amici 
Curiae, at 5-6.  These measures made the ACA’s individual mandate all the more 
critical in ensuring that private health insurance markets would continue to thrive.  
Amicus Brief of America’s Health Ins. Plans, at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) 
(Congressional finding that individual mandate’s minimization of adverse selection 
was “essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved 
health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of 
preexisting conditions can be sold.”)).  Absent the individual mandate, the Court 
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assuming it is in fact the case that those who do not have flood 
insurance face a lower flood risk, on average, than those who do, an 
individual mandate would strengthen the NFIP.172 
When discussing those who own property in 100-year flood zones 
and yet do not have flood insurance, it is important to remember that 
this group consists of two categories: those to whom the NFIP’s 
“lender mandate” does not apply, and those who are currently 
required to maintain flood insurance and yet do not do so.  An 
individual mandate would apply to the second group only to the 
extent that it is more effective at ensuring compliance than the lender 
mandate is today.  There is every reason to think this could be 
achieved.  If participation in the NFIP had nothing to do with 
whether one’s property was encumbered by a mortgage, there would 
be no reason for financial regulators, and the banks they oversee, to 
retain the duty of ensuring that borrowers comply with their 
obligation to hold flood insurance.  Since this system has not been 
particularly effective, giving the job of enforcing the mandate to 
FEMA, or indeed to the IRS, would likely increase participation 
among those who are already obligated to participate but do not.173 
It is hard to generalize about the first group, property owners who 
are not currently subject to the lender mandate but would be required 
to purchase flood insurance by an individual mandate.  One is 
tempted to conjure up images of the vacation homes of hedge fund 
managers, perched on oceanfront dunes and unencumbered by debt.  
This image may well be misleading.  In Pennsylvania, for instance, 
where flood zones are concentrated along rivers rather than on 
                                                                                                                 
observed, healthy people would “delay purchasing health insurance until they 
become sick, relying on the promise of guaranteed and affordable coverage.” 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585. 
 172. While no comprehensive study has evaluated the magnitude of the gap 
between the flood risk faced by those who purchase flood insurance and those who 
do not, adverse selection is almost universally treated as a significant problem 
faced by the NFIP and a major factor limiting FEMA’s ability to raise rates.  See, 
e.g., GAO, Continued Actions, supra note 103, at 5-6. 
 173. The Affordable Care Act penalizes through the tax system individuals who 
fail to maintain health insurance.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 7.  Although it remains to 
be seen how effective this provision will be, a similar enforcement mechanism 
could easily be adopted for flood insurance.  See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 
42, at 7, 42-55 (proposing replacement of the NFIP with a “mandatory social 
insurance plan” paid for with income tax withholding and featuring refunds and 
rate adjustments to encourage mitigation). 
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beaches, properties at risk of flood are, on average, lower in value 
and contain older residents who are more likely to live in poverty.174  
Regardless of whether property owners newly subject to a flood 
insurance mandate would be, as a group, more or less wealthy, their 
very participation in the NFIP would help it financially.  Because 
flood insurance risks are so highly correlated, having a larger pool of 
policyholders necessarily makes the program more financially 
stable.175 
C.  Strengthening the NFIP’s Safety Net and Relieving Pressure 
Elsewhere 
By requiring homeowners in flood-prone areas to carry flood 
insurance, an individual mandate would also strengthen the important 
safety net the NFIP provides.  This feature of flood insurance – its 
ability to insulate property owners from flood losses – would seem to 
be an unqualified good, and yet it has been one of the aspects of the 
NFIP that has led some to question the very idea of federally 
provided flood insurance.  A common refrain among those who have 
called for the outright elimination of the NFIP is that by helping 
property owners recoup their flood losses, the program is effectively 
encouraging them to rebuild in areas where it may not be wise, from 
a broader policy perspective, to do so.  Assuming that we should be 
doing all we can to discourage flood-prone development, these critics 
argue, the best course is to simply eliminate the NFIP and let 
property owners bear their losses and move to higher ground.176 
This argument rests on a faulty premise.  The political reality in 
America is that flood victims are not likely to be left to fend for 
themselves in the absence of a federal flood insurance program.  
Even with the NFIP in place, Congress has been moved to provide, 
                                                 
 174. Jeff Frantz, Five Things We Learned from the Senate Hearing on 
Skyrocketing Flood Insurance Costs, PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 28, 
2014, available at http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/01/ 
national_flood_insurance_progr_11.html (reporting testimony by Executive 
Director of the Center for Rural Pennsylvania before state Senate); see also 
Verchick & Johnson, supra note 3, at 715 (noting that “many floodplain 
communities . . . are not the playgrounds of the rich, but the working-class 
neighborhoods whose low property values attracted and maintained residents over 
time). 
 175. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 22-24. 
 176. See supra note 42. 
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with overwhelming support, massive aid packages in the wake of 
large floods.  In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
Congress approved, by a vote of 410 to 11 in the House and 97 to 0 
in the Senate, $51.8 billion in aid.177  That allocation would prove to 
be only the first of a series, eventually amounting to roughly $120 
billion.178  Portions of a number of post-Katrina appropriations 
eventually became Louisiana’s “Road Home” program, which began 
life with roughly $7.5 billion in federal funds.179  Under the program, 
homeowners received money to rebuild or repair their homes based 
on the amount of damage not covered by flood insurance.180  After 
Hurricane Sandy, Congress provided roughly $60 billion in aid, not 
just for the rescue and personal safety of victims, but also to 
compensate for property damage.181 
Nor is this solicitude for the needs of disaster victims a modern 
phenomenon.  Congress has, since the dawn of the republic, 
displayed a remarkable willingness to indemnify the victims of 
disasters of all varieties.182  Some have attributed this munificence to 
the same correlation problem that made private flood insurance so 
difficult to provide.  Because disasters tend to be concentrated in one 
geographic area, their victims form natural “interest groups” that, in 
our political system, can plead their case in Congress with particular 
                                                 
 177. Peter Baker & Amy Goldstein, Congress Approves $51.8 Billion for 
Victims, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2005. 
 178. BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43537, FEMA’S DISASTER 
RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 13 (2014). 
 179. Davida Finger, Stranded and Squandered: Lost on the Road Home, 7 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 59, 64, n.26 (2008) (citing series of appropriations); Leslie 
Eaton, Slow Home Grants Stall Progress in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
2006, at A1. 
 180. See Leslie Eaton, Hurricane Aid Finally Flowing Directly to Homeowners, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at A1.  The Road Home Program funneled money 
appropriated by Congress through the department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s Community Development Block Grant program.  Louisiana and 
Mississippi administered distinct programs, with different rules and different 
priorities.  One notable feature of Louisiana’s plan was that it imposed a thirty 
percent penalty on homeowners who were required to purchase flood insurance 
under the NFIP’s lender mandate but did not do so.  See id. 
 181. Lindsay, supra note 178, at 13. 
 182. Michele L. Landis, Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’: Disaster Relief 
and the Origins of the Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 973 et seq. 
(1998). 
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effectiveness.183  Others have detected a moral judgment, one that 
treats victims as blameless and thus deserving.184  The broader point 
is that generous disaster relief has always been a theme of 
Congressional action.  There is thus every reason to think that if the 
NFIP were eliminated, the political pressure to provide this type of 
aid would only increase.185  The moral hazard that arises from 
indemnifying the losses of flood victims wasn’t created by the NFIP.  
The NFIP merely allowed it to take a particular shape, one channel 
among many by which the government socializes the losses 
associated with floods. 
It is thus more productive to start with the premise that the risks of 
flooding will be spread beyond the property owners who bear them, 
whether through the NFIP or otherwise.  Under the NFIP, at least as 
it is intended to function, those risks are spread onto other owners of 
flood-prone properties.  Without the NFIP, they would be spread onto 
all American taxpayers.  The popular notion that the NFIP creates a 
moral hazard by incentivizing property ownership in flood-prone 
                                                 
 183. See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its 
Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 4-6 (1996). 
 184. Landis, supra note 182, at 971, 988-98 (tracing the “intellectual and 
spiritual traditions prevalent among the founders” that “provide some insight into 
the sympathetic treatment they afforded disasters”). 
 185. It would also, I submit, be morally unacceptable to adopt a policy of 
refusing any governmental aid to owners of flooded property.  Arguments for the 
elimination of the NFIP are often couched in moral terms, suggesting that people 
who “choose” to own property in flood-prone areas “know” the risks and thus 
should be forced to bear them.  See, e.g., Richard Reeves, Hurricane$, 
Earthquake$ and Flood$: If People Want to Build Their Houses in Dangerous 
Places, Why Should the Rest of Us Pay When Disaster Strikes?, 26 WASH. 
MONTHLY 10 (1994).  As for the concept of choice, it is simplistic and unfair to 
think that every flood victim could just move out of a flood-prone area if he or she 
chose.  Here I am thinking in particular of residents of the Lower Ninth Ward, 
which was quite poor but had a notably high rate of homeownership before large 
swaths of the neighborhood were wiped out by Hurricane Katrina.  See Juliette 
Landphair, The Forgotten People of New Orleans: Community, Vulnerability, and 
the Lower Ninth Ward, 94 J. OF AM. HIST. 837, 837, n.3 (Dec. 2007).  Nor does the 
idea that people “know” the risk when they move in hold up under scrutiny.  
Accurately understanding the flood risk faced by a particular property is a task that 
defeated private insurance companies in the 20th century and has at times 
flummoxed even the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  Homeowners 
typically “know the risks” of flooding only because they are able to consult a FIRM 
that has been prepared by the government, a document that would presumably not 
exist if the call to eliminate the NFIP were heeded. 
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areas is thus misleading at best, because it requires assuming that 
individuals would be forced to bear flood risks on their own if the 
NFIP were eliminated.186  In fact, far from creating a moral hazard, 
the NFIP has the potential to substantially reduce the corrosive 
subsidy that other forms of flood protection and aid provide to 
owners of flood-prone property. 
D.  Efficiently Discouraging Risky Development 
It is, at this point, clear that we should not be encouraging 
ownership of flood-prone property by providing a subsidy in the form 
of below-market flood insurance.  Indeed, if we are to stand any 
chance of adapting to a future of rising seas, powerful hurricanes, and 
frequent downpours, national policy should help facilitate the 
migration of people out of harm’s way. Governmental approaches to 
discouraging settlement in flood zones could take a wide range of 
forms.  The most extreme approach would be to simply outlaw 
permanent human habitation in certain areas, which would make 
floods relatively toothless in terms of their ability to harm or kill 
people or even disrupt our daily routines or affect the economy.  This 
has, in fact, been done in certain limited areas.187  Prohibiting flood-
                                                 
 186. For all its problems, the NFIP has proved to be a much more effective tool 
for compensating property owners who suffer flood losses than alternative 
mechanisms that have been established after major disasters.  Louisiana’s Road 
Home Program was scandalously inept at handing out money.  In its first four 
months, the program closed fewer than one hundred homeowner grants, leading the 
RAND Corporation to conclude that “the overall timeliness of the grant-making 
process has not been consistently good and predictable.”  RICK EDEN & PATRICIA 
BOREN, TIMELY ASSISTANCE: EVALUATING THE SPEED OF ROAD HOME 
GRANTMAKING 68 (RAND Gulf State Policy Institute, RAND Corporation 2008), 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2008/RAND 
_DB557.pdf; see also Editorial, The Long Wait Home, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Mar. 23, 2008, at 6 (responding to RAND report); Finger, supra note 
179, at 62-63.  The NFIP, by contrast, had paid more than 95% of all its Gulf Coast 
claims by May 2006, eight months after Katrina.  See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: NEW 
PROCESSES AIDED HURRICANE KATRINA CLAIMS HANDLING, BUT FEMA’S 
OVERSIGHT SHOULD BE IMPROVED, at 6 (Dec. 2006), available at 
www.gao.gov/assets/260/254481.pdf. 
 187. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that 
South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act had effected a taking by preventing 
property owner from building any permanent habitable structure on coastal land he 
had purchased with that goal in mind).  Notably, bans on development in fragile 
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prone habitation by fiat is not, however, a viable solution to the long 
term problem of flooding, for a host of reasons.  Perhaps most 
obviously, it would require the forced abandonment of enormous 
portions of the country, where millions of people live and work.188 
Even if it were politically or legally feasible, the forced, permanent 
evacuation of flood zones would not be a desirable or efficient 
response to the problem of flood risk.  Flood zones contain many 
billions of dollars worth of real estate, comprising an untold number 
of beloved homes and successful businesses.189  While the costs 
associated with flood damage can be staggering, it is wrong to 
assume that they always outweigh the benefits derived by property 
owners.  Consider, as a simplistic example, a fisherman who lives 
and works in an exposed coastal area.  If he earns a profit of 
$100,000 every year by living and working there, it will only make 
sense for him to abandon the coast and move inland if he calculates 
his flood risk at more than $100,000 per year.  In other words, as 
long as the fisherman’s flood insurance premiums are less than the 
benefit he derives from his flood-prone property, he’ll choose to stay. 
Human beings are not purely rational actors, and flooding has the 
nasty tendency to overwhelm even the most well-reasoned analyses 
of its risks.  Calculations of the expected “cost” of a flood are also 
not capable of capturing the tragic loss of a life, or a thousand.  Still, 
it is both reasonable and desirable to allow people to weigh for 
themselves the costs and benefits of exposure to some degree of 
disaster risk.  It is a mistake to think that flood damage must be 
avoided at all costs, because it is in many cases perfectly rational to 
accept the costs of flooding and continue to own property in a flood-
prone area.190  Exposure to flood risk should be discouraged, but only 
                                                                                                                 
coastal zones like that discussed in Lucas are usually motivated by conservation 
rather than avoiding flood risk.  See id. at 1009-10. 
 188. Under current takings jurisprudence, government would also be required to 
compensate property owners for this type of eviction, making it prohibitively 
expensive.  See John R. Nolan, Land Use and Climate Change: Lawyers 
Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521 (2013) (discussing 
takings clause obstacles to preventing development in flood prone areas). 
 189. Approximately 123.3 million people lived in coastal shoreline counties as of 
2010, roughly half the U.S. population.  Ernest B. Abbott, Flood Insurance and 
Climate Change: Rising Sea Levels Challenge the NFIP, 26 Fordham Envtl. L. 
Rev. 10, 10-11 (2014). 
 190. Oil companies, which can be relied upon to be more calculating than the 
average person when it comes to cost/benefit analyses, provide a handy illustration. 
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to an efficient degree.  Mandatory flood insurance is an excellent way 
of doing this, and would have salutary effects at the individual, local, 
and national levels. 
1.  Individual Effects 
Forcing property owners to pay premiums at actuarial rates 
presents them with an annualized estimate of the costs associated 
with the flood risk they face, and allows them to consider whether 
those costs are outweighed by the benefits they derive from their 
property.  As Biggert-Waters ushered in increases in the premiums 
paid by many policyholders, it created a kind of natural experiment 
for examining how this mechanism works in the real world.  In 
innumerable news stories from the local papers in flood-prone areas, 
homeowners reported being “priced out” of their homes by rising 
flood insurance premiums.191  In many cases, a direct impact was felt 
in the real estate market, as the knowledge that ownership of a 
property would carry with it a bill for thousands of dollars in flood 
                                                                                                                 
Of the 4,000 platforms in the Gulf, 31 were severely damaged and 109 were 
completely destroyed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Ninety-one percent of the 
area’s oil production capacity was knocked offline, and BP, to pick one example, 
reported that the two hurricanes had cost it $700 million.  See Heather Timmons & 
Vikas Bajaj, BP Details its Damages from Hurricanes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, 
at C5.  It’s not hard to put a price on the amount of oil still left underground, 
though, and to realize that making repairs and reopening is the right decision.  See 
Jad Mouawad & Barry Meier, Risk-Taking Rises as Oil Rigs in Gulf Drill Deeper, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at A1 (reporting increased investment in offshore 
platforms).  For a more prosaic example, see Nick Malawskey, Riverside Artist, 83, 
Says Flood Insurance Rates are Part of the Cost of the View, PATRIOT-NEWS 
(Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 24, 2014, available at http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/ 
index.ssf/2014/01/flood_insurance_homeowners_sto.html (reporting elderly 
resident of flood-prone house next to Susquehanna River’s decision to accept 
higher premiums and remain in her home). 
 191. See, e.g., Editorial, Nation’s Flood Insurance Program Still Broken, N.J. 
STAR-LEDGER, March 19, 2014; Jordan Blum, House Passes Flood Insurance Rate 
Delay as Part of Budget Bill, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), January 18, 2014; 
Jenny Anderson, Outrage as Homeowners Prepare for Substantially Higher Flood 
Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2013, at A12; see also Abbot, supra note 
189, at 54 (“The ironic result of the [Biggert-Waters] increases was that a program 
designed to protect homeowners from losing their homes due to the possibility of 
future flooding instead threatened homeowners with the probability of losing their 
homes due to foreclosure well before any floodwaters arrived.”). 
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insurance premiums had its impact on prices.192  This reaction proves 
that it’s not federal flood insurance itself that creates a moral hazard, 
it’s subsidized premiums. 
The fallout over Biggert-Waters highlights another key feature of 
flood insurance premiums as a mechanism for discouraging risky 
development: their effects are felt ex-ante.  Without flood insurance, 
the costs of flood damage are borne by property owners only after 
floods occur (and then only if they do not receive some other form of 
aid).  Flood insurance premiums annualize and internalize the costs 
of flooding before any flood occurs, allowing – forcing, even – 
homeowners to account for and react to their flood risk before they 
are flooded.  This feature heightens the ability of flood insurance to 
deter risky development before its risks are realized, and before 
homes are actually flooded. 
In this sense, flood insurance has the ability to function something 
like a zoning system.  Like zoning, flood insurance regulates land use 
(in that it discourages certain types of construction) in certain 
geographic areas (in that purchasing it would be mandatory in those 
areas).  Unlike zoning, however, flood insurance functions by 
imposing burdens in the form of annual premiums on certain 
conduct.  Where the typical zoning scheme simply mandates that 
certain properties be put to certain uses, flood insurance functions as 
an incentive system, discouraging rather than forbidding certain 
activities.193  In this sense flood insurance functions more like a 
common-law nuisance system, with its fine-grained ability to allocate 
burdens and discourage behavior efficiently rather than outlawing 
behavior categorically.  Unlike nuisance, though, flood insurance 
functions ex-ante and doesn’t require costly individual adjudication. 
It is unreasonable to think that people are capable of performing 
this kind of analysis without being required to pay flood insurance 
                                                 
 192. See supra note 160. 
 193. Critics of the currently byzantine zoning systems in place in many 
American cities have pointed out that zoning could be made both more equitable 
and more flexible if it imposed costs on certain activities rather than outlawing 
them while making variances and exemptions available to the politically connected.  
One scholar, for instance, proposes a tax on certain land uses that aims to capture 
the externalities created by those uses, thereby encouraging favored uses while 
discouraging others to varying degrees.  See Stewart E. Sterk, Exploring Taxation 
as a Substitute for Overregulation in the Development Process, 78 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 417, 431-34 (2013). 
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premiums.  Individuals’ ability to account for and prepare for remote 
yet potentially catastrophic risks is impaired by a series of much-
studied cognitive biases.  First, and perhaps most damning, is 
individuals’ general inability to accurately estimate the probability of 
particular hazards.194  Certain risks, like the possibility of being 
harmed by violent crime, are usually overestimated, while others are 
routinely underestimated.195  Social scientists have noticed that 
perceptions of the likelihood of disasters tend to spike just after 
disasters occur and then quickly recede.196  One common explanation 
is that perceptions of unlikely but catastrophic risk are subject to a 
kind of recall bias.  Risks that are easily called to mind, whether 
because they frequently appear in the evening news or because they 
recently occurred, loom large, while risks that have faded from 
consciousness are underappreciated.197  Indeed, this effect can be 
traced in the rates at which people purchase flood insurance, which 
are highly correlated with whether they have experienced flood 
losses in the previous year.198  That this is not surprising speaks to the 
power of our bias favoring reaction to yesterday’s news. 
Perhaps equally distorting is the tendency to believe that the 
overall statistical likelihood of an event should be represented over 
short time periods, or conversely, that occurrences over small sample 
periods can be extrapolated far into the future.  Note, for example, 
that if you toss a coin four times, getting two heads and two tails is 
the most likely outcome, and yet will happen only 37.5% of the 
                                                 
 194. See Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND 
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 153, 158 (Ronald J. Daniels, 
Donald F. Kettl, & Howard Kunreuther, eds., 2006). 
 195. Id. at 158-59 (citing Jennifer S. Lerner, et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on 
Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14 J. OF 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 144 (2003) (this study asked a sample of 973 Americans 
what they thought was the probability that they would be harmed by violent crime 
in the coming year.  The mean answer was 43%, just under the mean estimate of 
how likely they were to contract the flu, 47%.). 
 196. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of 
Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to 
the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
BULLETIN 39 (1992). 
 197. Meyer, supra note 194, at 159. 
 198. Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for Flood Insurance: 
Empirical Evidence, 20 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 291, 291 (2000). 
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time.199  It is a common human intuition, perhaps borne of our 
tendency to learn by trial and error, to believe that recent experience 
is a fair guide to the future.200  When it comes to irregularly spaced 
events like floods, this just isn’t so.  To take but one example, South 
Florida was directly hit by 27 hurricanes between 1887 and 1969, an 
average of about one every three years.201  And yet in the 21 years 
between 1970 and the arrival of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, only two 
hurricanes hit the region.  During this lull, development in the area 
exploded, with catastrophic results.202  Hurricane Andrew caused 
roughly $16 billion in losses,203 much of which was attributed to 
recent coastal development.204 
Beyond hindering our ability to accurately estimate our risk of 
flood, cognitive biases can prevent us from taking purely rational 
measures to protect against that risk.  One of the most important 
biases at work here is our tendency to overvalue immediate, certain 
costs and undervalue long-term, uncertain benefits.205  Many scholars 
who study these problems focus on the troubling failure of 
individuals to take fairly simple, low-cost actions like complying 
                                                 
 199. Meyer, supra note 194, at 160. 
 200. Meyer explains several other ways in which trial-and-error learning 
hampers our ability to make rational decisions in the face of disasters.  People tend 
to react to their most recent experience.  For instance, many people decided not to 
evacuate before the arrival of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 because evacuating for 
Hurricane Ivan in 2004 had proved time-consuming, costly, and pointless.  Meyer 
points out that this type of reactive behavior creates a “censoring bias,” in which 
prudent preparations that keep individuals out of harm’s way tend to be self-
defeating, because by averting the harm people are more likely to underestimate the 
magnitude of the hazard they faced.  See id. at 156; see also Robert J. Meyer, 
Failing to Learn from Experience about Catastrophes: The Case of Hurricane 
Preparedness, 45 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 25, 26-27 (2012) (reporting 
experimental findings demonstrating that “the tendency to reduce investments in 
protection given the absence of past losses is observed regardless of whether the 
reason for this absence was the lack of a storm event or the presence of past 
mitigation”). 
 201. Meyer, supra note 194, at 160. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Burby, supra note 20, at 178. 
 204. Meyer, supra note 194, at 160. 
 205. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 AM. 
ECON. REV.103, 103 (1999) (examining “human tendency to grab immediate 
rewards and to avoid immediate costs”); see also Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew 
Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 121 (2001). 
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with mandatory evacuation orders in the face of oncoming 
hurricanes.  This cognitive bias is even more pronounced in the 
context relevant here.206  Choosing to live farther away from a job or 
loved ones to avoid a risk of flood, or choosing to spend many 
thousands of dollars elevating or otherwise flood-proofing one’s 
home, requires making significant and immediate personal sacrifices 
to account for a risk that is often very distant and uncertain. 
Mandatory flood insurance would reduce the impact of these biases 
in a number of ways.  First, as noted previously, flood insurance 
smooths out the cost of flooding over time, taking immensely costly, 
rare events and distributing their costs into smaller payments that 
come due every year.  One’s susceptibility to the various cognitive 
biases discussed above becomes irrelevant; premiums must be paid.  
Changing the way the costs of flooding are felt also removes flood 
risk from the realm of long term costs (which are underestimated) 
and places them firmly in the realm of immediate, certain costs 
(which tend to elicit an overreaction).  And by offering reduced 
premiums in exchange for individual mitigation efforts (which the 
NFIP already does), flood insurance offers immediate rewards in 
exchange for immediate costs, a trade people stand a much greater 
chance of making.  As the reaction to Biggert-Waters demonstrated, 
these changes have the power to influence individual decisions.  The 
effect of simply informing individuals that an area faces a high risk 
of flood has been less pronounced. 
2.  Local Effects 
An individual mandate for flood insurance would also strengthen 
the pressure on local governments to confront their communities’ 
flood risk and take measures to mitigate it.  Despite the fact that flood 
losses are felt most keenly on a local level, local governments have 
proved particularly inept when it comes to adopting and enforcing 
mitigation measures.207  This has been referred to as the “local 
government paradox,” and examples of its power abound.208 
                                                 
 206. Meyer, supra note 194, at 165 (noting that this bias is “particularly acute” 
“[w]hen making a choice between a current or delayed mitigation investment”). 
 207. Burby, supra note 20, at 178 (noting that “virtually no local governments in 
the United States had adopted building or zoning regulations to mitigate flood 
losses” before they were required to do so in order to participate in the NFIP). 
 208. Id. at 178-81; see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
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Mandatory flood insurance would do much to drag flood risk into 
prominence as a local political issue.  To some extent the fallout from 
Biggert-Waters, and the rapidity with which it was virtually repealed, 
provide a handy demonstration, as politicians rushed to co-sponsor 
the legislation that became the Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014.209  The efficacy of the Community Rating 
System, which coaxes municipalities into adopting measures that 
help reduce their flood risk, depends in large part on the degree of 
pressure it can place on local governments.210  The more salient flood 
insurance premiums become as a local political issue, the more local 
governments will choose to enact stricter building codes and take 
other measures that reduce premiums for the entire community.  By 
requiring more people to participate in the program, an individual 
mandate for flood insurance would increase the pressure on local 
governments to mitigate their flood risk.211 
3.  National Effects 
A stronger NFIP would also lessen the pressure on Congress to 
provide massive, one-off relief packages in the wake of major floods.  
The National Research Council’s report to the Army Corps of 
Engineers on flood risks along the East and Gulf Coasts made this 
point forcefully.  The federal government’s tendency to shoulder the 
burden of paying for flood recovery, the report noted, “leads to 
inefficiencies and inappropriate incentives that serve to increase the 
nation’s exposure to risk.”212  The report referred to this 
“misalignment of risks” as “[a] major impediment to U.S. coastal 
hazard management.”213 
Shifting the burden of paying for flood losses from Congressional 
emergency appropriations to the NFIP would do much to alleviate 
this problem.  There are already signs that the felt need for 
                                                 
 209. The act had 238 cosponsors. 
 210. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
 211. Indeed, the National Research Council’s report on coastal risk argued that 
mitigation measures have been an underutilized tool in reducing the harms 
associated with coastal floods, and cited the need for stronger incentives for local 
governments to participate in the Community Rating System, particularly in light 
of the significant demonstrated reduction in risk associated with that participation.  
See supra note 5, at 89. 
 212. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 3. 
 213. Id. at 55. 
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emergency funding is sensitive to the ability of flood insurance to 
cover flood damage.  The post-Katrina Road Home program 
provided aid only for losses not covered by insurance, and imposed a 
penalty on those who were required to have flood insurance but did 
not.214  The manner in which Congress reacts to floods carries its 
own message.  By treating floods as worthy of massive emergency 
appropriations, Congress is implicitly treating floods as events that 
individuals should not be expected to have planned for, events that 
are unpredictable and extraordinary and whose burden will be shared 
nationally.  Flood insurance premiums, by contrast, carry with them 
an air of inevitability, and imposing a tax penalty on those who fail to 
maintain their policies sends a very different signal than a hundred 
billion dollars in post-disaster aid. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Dealing with our rising national flood risk is, or should be, a matter 
of urgency.  Federal efforts to confront this problem have, over the 
course of the past half-century, consisted of large-scale engineering 
projects, massive post-disaster aid, and flood insurance offered at 
largely below-market rates.  All of these have the unfortunate effect 
of shifting the burden of flood risk from those who live in flood 
zones to the country as a whole, thereby making coastal living more 
attractive than it should be.  Individually-mandated flood insurance 
with premiums set at actuarial levels could be a key tool in placing 
the burden of flood risk back where it belongs, on those who are 
directly affected by floods, while still providing a safety net in case 
of disaster.  Notably, however, mandatory flood insurance would 
impose these costs before flood risks are realized, allowing us to 
decide individually one of the most important questions we face 
collectively: how much risk are we willing to accept? 
                                                 
 214. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
